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Abstract
A paradigm shift in distribution system design and planning is being led by the
deregulation of the power industry and the increasing adoption of distributed gen-
eration (DG). Technology advances have made DG investments feasible by both
local distribution companies (LDCs) and small power producers (SPPs). LDCs are
interested in finding optimal long term plans that best serve their customers at the
lowest cost. SPPs, as private entities, are concerned about maximizing their rates
of return. Also keenly interested in distribution design and planning is the govern-
ment, which, through an electricity regulator, strives to meet DG penetration and
emissions reduction goals through policy implementations.
This thesis first examines the distribution system planning problem from the
LDC’s perspective. An innovative hierarchical dynamic optimization model is pro-
posed for the planning of distribution systems and the energy scheduling of units
that is also capable of reconciling uncoordinated SPP investments in DG. The first
stage of the two-stage framework consists of a siting-cum-period planning model
that sets element sizing and commissioning dates. The second stage consists of a
capacity-cum-production planning model that finalizes element capacities and en-
ergy import/export and production schedules. The proposed framework is demon-
strated on a 32-bus radial distribution system. Four case studies encompassing
different policy sets are also conducted, demonstrating that this model’s usefulness
also extends to predicting the impact of different energy policies on distribution
system operation and economics.
The analysis of different policy sets is further expanded upon through the pro-
posal of a new mathematical model that approaches the distribution design problem
from the regulator’s perspective. Various case studies examining policies that may
be used by the regulator to meet DG penetration and emissions goals, through DG
investment, are constructed. A combination of feed-in-tariffs, CO2 tax, and cap-
and-trade mechanisms are among the policies studied. The results, in the context
of Ontario, Canada and its Standard Offer Program, are discussed, with respect to
achieving objectives in DG investment, participation by SPPs, consumer costs, and
uncertainty in carbon market prices.
In jurisdictions such as Ontario, the LDC cannot invest in its own DG capacity
but must accommodate those of SPPs. With the successful implementation of DG
investment incentives by the regulator, there is a potential for significant invest-
ments in DG by SPPs, which may exceed that of the LDCs ability to absorb. This
thesis proposes a novel method that can be used by the regulator or LDC to fairly
assess, coordinate, and approve multiple competing investments proposals while
maintaining operational feasibility of the distribution system. This method uses a
feedback between the LDC and SPPs to achieve maximum investor participation
while adhering to the technical operational limits of the distribution system. The
proposed scheme is successfully demonstrated on a 32-bus radial distribution sys-
tem, where it is shown to increase SPP-DG investments and production, improve
the system’s voltage profile, and reduce losses.
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Rs Reserve margin (% of demand) X
sp. Prefix denoting value from the SPPM solution X
SSmax Maximum number of substations X
V max Maximum bus voltage limit (p.u.) X X X
V min Minimum bus voltage limit (p.u.) X X X
W capi,t Capacitor size (MVar) X X
W dg.iniq,i Initial DG unit size (MW) X
W dg.maxk / Maximum DG unit size (MW) X
W dg.maxk,q / " " X
W dg.maxq " " X
W dg.mink,q Minimum DG unit size (MW) X
W dg.minq Minimum DG unit size (MW) X
W dgk SPP DG unit size (MW) X
W fdr.st(i,j),t / Existing feeder/intertie/substation (step) X
W int.st(i,j),t/ capacity – changes from year to year X
W ss.sti,t up to end of life (MW) X
W inti,t Intertie capacity (MW) X X
W ssi,t Substation capacity (MW) X X
W int.maxi Maximum intertie build size (MW) X
W ss.maxi Maximum substation build size (MW) X
W ss.mini Minimum substation build size (MW) X






θi,b,t Voltage angle (rad.) X
CO2xst CO2 emissions in excess of CO2
cap (t) X
P dgk,i,b,t SPP-DG production (MW) X X
P dgk,q,i,b,t " " X
P dgq,i,b,t Utility-DG production (MW) X X
P fdr(i,j),b,t Power flow on feeder between (i, j) (MW) X
P inti,b,t Intertie power import/export (MW) X X
P ssi,b,t Substation power import/export (MW) X X X
P.codgg,b,t DG unit power constrained-off (MW) X
P.ovldfdr.r(i,j),b,t Remaining feeder power flow overload (MW) X
P.rdnfdr(i,j),b,t Feeder power flow reduction (MW) X
P.subdgg,b,t Subtraction in DG unit output (MW) X
P xi,b,t Power export to grid (MW) X X
Qcapi,b,t Reactive power output from capacitor (MVar) X
Vi,b,t Voltage (p.u.) X X X
wdgk,i,t Capacity added to DG unit (MW) X X
wdgk,q,i,t " " X
wdgq,i,t Capacity added to DG unit(MW) X
wfdr(i,j),t Capacity added to feeder (i, j) (MW) X X
wfdr.pen(i,j),t Penalized capacity addition to feeder (i, j) (MW) X
winti,t Capacity added to intertie (MW) X
wssi,t Capacity added to substation (MW) X
zdgk,i,t/ Decision on DG build/upgrade (0/1) X
zdgk,q,i,t/ " " X X
zdgq,i,t " " X X
zdg
P
i,k Decision on SPP-DG k location (0/1) X





zinti,t Decision on intertie build/upgrade (0/1) X
zpf(i,j),b,t Power flow directional flag (0/1) X X
zssi,t Decision on substation build/upgrade (0/1) X
zssi Substation at site flag (0/1) X





Policy changes and advancements in distributed generation (DG) technologies are
introducing paradigm shifts in distribution systems design, planning, and opera-
tion. The transition of the electric power industry from a regulated monopoly to a
competitive market has been the largest seen of any industry [1]. Deregulation has
affected not only generators but many local distribution companies (LDCs) who
now must decide from whom to purchase energy.
At the same time, technological advances have also led to the ascent of DG as a
viable alternative for meeting the energy needs of distribution systems. With DG,
LDCs, now, have the option of placing generating sources within their distribution
system instead of purchasing from bulk generation; alternatively, in a deregulated
environment they may be obliged to permit small power producers (SPPs) to install
DG units in their system.
In addition, changes to the design, planning, and operation of distribution sys-
tems are being driven by policies aimed at mitigating emissions from electricity
generation. These policies may include incentives aimed at encouraging invest-
ment in sources of clean or renewable energy, which includes a good portion of
DG technology. Other environmental-based policy initiatives are carbon tax and
cap-and-trade mechanisms, which create additional costs that, however, need to be
factored into the price of energy.
This thesis will explore some aspects of the planning of distribution systems,
in the context of investment in DG driven by the aforementioned factors. In this
chapter, a definition and brief review of distribution systems will be given in Section
1.2, followed by a review of distributed energy resources (DER), including DG, in
Section 1.3, and an introduction to deregulation in Section 1.4. Finally, an overview
of the research and the motivation behind it will be presented in Section 1.5.
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1.2 Distribution Systems
The chief constituents of the bulk electric power system are generation, transmis-
sion/sub-transmission, and distribution. Traditionally, the transmission system
carries electricity from the bulk generation system to the sub-transmission system at
voltage levels of 230 kV or higher. The sub-transmission system then transfers the
power at voltage levels between 69 kV – 138 kV to the distribution systems. Finally,
the distribution systems, at voltages typically under 34.5 kV, delivers electricity to
the consumer. An illustration of a typical bulk electric power system is given in
























Figure 1.1: Typical Representation of a Bulk Electric Power System
The distribution system can be divided into primary and secondary systems.
The primary distribution system consists of distribution substations and feeders.
The distribution substations step down power from the sub-transmission system to
between 4.16 kV and 34.5 kV. From there, electricity is distributed through pri-
mary feeders, and then lateral feeders, to the secondary distribution system. At the
secondary distribution system electricity is stepped down to between 120/240 and
480 V, which can be used directly by the consumer. Note that large industrial cus-
tomers may connect to any point along the network. The research presented in this
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thesis is concerned with the primary distribution system, traditionally consisting
of distribution substations and primary feeders at the 4.16 kV to 34.5 kV voltage
level. Laterals and the secondary distribution system are aggregated as loads along
the primary feeder.
1.2.1 Configuration
There are three common distribution system design configurations: radial, loop,









Figure 1.2: Primary Distribution System – Radial Configuration
The radially configured distribution system is the most common. In comparison
to the other two configurations it has the lowest capital cost; however, it also has
the lowest reliability, since any faults in the feeders will cause service interruptions
at all points downstream. On the other hand, network configured distribution
systems are the most reliable, but its numerous feeders with associated protection
and control systems also make it the most expensive. Network configurations may
be used in high density areas, such as downtown cores. Loop configured distribution
systems fall in between the two in terms of cost and reliability. They require higher
capacity cabling than radial systems, but can also redistribute power flows in the
case of a fault, maintaining service.
1.2.2 Infrastructure Design and Planning
The classical approach to distribution system design and planning first involves
load forecasting. This is followed by the siting and optimum sizing of substations,
and finally feeder routing and design [3]. Different methods and techniques for
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Figure 1.4: Primary Distribution System – Network Configuration
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1.3 Distributed Generation
DER, also called distributed resources (DR), are “demand and supply-side resources
that can be deployed throughout an electric power distribution system (...) to
meet the energy and reliability needs of the customers served by that system...
installed on either the customer side or the utility side of the meter” [4]. Distributed
generation, storage resources, and demand side management (DSM) options fall
under this definition.
Gellings [5] describes DSM as “the planning, implementation, and monitoring
of those utility activities designed to influence customer use of electricity in ways
that will produce desired changes in the utility’s load shape.” These measures
are enacted by utilities to optimize the use of available energy; examples include
the addition of thermal storage units or the promotion and installation of energy
efficient appliances. Storage resources allow electricity to be stored for later use,
such as backup power or peak shaving. Typical technologies used in this application
include flywheels and batteries. DG is the primary subject of this thesis and is
discussed below.
1.3.1 Definition
DG is succinctly defined as “electric power source[s] connected directly to the dis-
tribution network or on the customer side of the meter” [6]. This definition is
accommodating, allowing a variety of technologies and implementations across dif-
ferent utility structures, while avoiding the pitfalls of using more stringent criteria
based on rules such as power ratings and power delivery area.
Two categories for the classification of DG are also proposed in [6]. The first
classification is based upon unit capacity:
• Micro 1 W - 5 kW
• Small 5 kW - 5 MW
• Medium 5 MW - 50 MW
• Large 50 MW - 300 MW (rare)
The second classification is based on technology:
• Renewable
• Modular
• Combined heat and power (CHP)
DG units based on renewable energy resources can be readily replenished and
are viewed as ‘environmentally friendly’. Modular DG refers to units that can
be built and placed within a short time span and can be operated together (as
distinct units) to meet larger output requirements. All DG units will be regarded
as modular in this thesis. Combined heat and power (CHP) units, discussed later,
generate usable process heat as well as electric power.
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1.3.2 Technologies
Several technologies can be used for DG systems, as identified by Püttgen et al. [7],
Zareipour et al. [8], and the International Energy Agency [9]. These technologies
and their characteristics are summarized in Table 1.1.
Biogas
Biogas plants use biomass waste products from agricultural activities, using anaer-
obic biodigesters to create natural gas that can be used to generate electricity and
heat. Although these plants produce emissions, these emissions are less than what
would have otherwise been emitted from the unused biomass fuel.
Fuel Cells
There are various fuel cell technologies available – all use interactions between hy-
drogen and oxygen to generate electricity. Although comparatively very expensive,
they operate silently and produce much lower levels of CO2 and NOx emissions.
Micro-hydro
Micro-hydro technology is another emission-free technology – however their place-
ment is confined to where there is adequate water flow.
Reciprocating Engines
Reciprocating engine technology is the most prevalent DG unit technology [9].
Reliable, these engines use cylinders and pistons to generate power (the internal
combustion engines of cars use this technology). However, they are also noisy, and
their use of fossil fuels means that they emit high levels of CO2 and NOx gases, as
can be seen in Table 1.1.
Small Gas Turbines and Microturbines
Turbines essentially use the same technology as those of jet engines. Having lower
electrical efficiencies than that of the engines, their total output of useful energy
can be greatly increased if these systems are used in CHP applications. They are
also noisy, but have lower NOx emissions than other engine types.
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Table 1.1: Summary of Typical DG Technologies [9], [10], [11], [12]
Usage Cost Emissions (kg/MWh)
Technology
Res Com Ind Rem
Typical Size
Capital ($/kW) O&M ($/MWh) Fuel ($/MWh) CO2 NOx
Biogas Y 15 kW – 5 MW 4,000 01 01 negative2 negative2
High Temp. Fuel Cell Y Y P 50 kW – 3 MW 1,000 – 2,000 5 – 10 430 – 490 88 – 112 0.005 – 0.01
Low Temp. Fuel Cell (PAFC) Y Y 50 – 500 kW 3,000 5 – 10 88 – 112 430 – 490 0.005 – 0.01
Low Temp. Fuel Cell (PEM) Y Y P P 1 – 250 kW 1,000 – 2,000 5 – 10 88 – 112 430 – 490 0.005 – 0.01
Gas Turbine Y Y P 500 kW – 20 MW 650 – 900 3 – 8 48 – 72 580 – 680 0.3 – 0.5
Microturbine Y Y P 25 – 500 kW 1,000 – 1,300 5 - 10 56 – 72 720 0.1
Reciprocating Engine (Diesel) Y Y Y P 20 kW – 10 MW 350 – 500 5 – 10 56 – 88 650 10
Reciprocating Engine (Gas) Y Y Y P 50 kW – 5 MW 600 – 10,00 7 – 15 48 – 72 500 – 620 0.2 – 1.0
Solar-Photovoltaic Y P Y 0.05 – 200 kW 5,000 – 10,000 1 – 4 0 0 0
Stirling Engines Y P 0.5 – 200 kW 700 - -1,500 Varies by Fuel Type
Wind Turbines Y Y Y Y 1 kW – 2.5 MW 1,500 – 3,000 10 0 0 0
Res: Residential Customer; Com: Commercial Customer; Ind: Industrial Customer; Rem: Remote Customer
Y: Yes; P: Potential
1: Biogas fuel costs may be offset by biomass gate fees and sale of by-products.
2: Emissions from biogas plants are less than that from unused biomass, resulting in a net reduction in emissions.
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Solar-Photovoltaic (PV) Cells
Solar-PV technologies harness sunlight to produce electrical power; to their ad-
vantage they are emissions free and have very low operating costs. However, they
cannot be placed in all locations and high capital costs limit their wide-spread
adoption; also, without storage support their output is non-uniform.
Stirling Engines
Stirling engines differ from most reciprocating engines in that the gas within the
piston assembly is sealed - the heat used to generate power is external to the
assembly. This engine type has low noise levels and can be adapted for many
fuel types (any source of heat), though it is more expensive than the reciprocating
engine.
Wind Turbines
Wind turbines, like solar-PV technology, are also emissions free; they derive their
electricity from wind. They are commonly used in wind farms with many units
operating together (outside the definition of DG), although they can be used in
standalone mode as DG. They have similar drawbacks as solar-PV technology:
high cost, limited placement possibilities, and non-uniform output.
1.3.3 Applications
DG units have many possible applications within the distribution system, such
as backup (standby) power, peak shaving, export to the distribution grid, CHP,
reactive power and voltage support, and island operation during faults. One of
the important applications of DG, the possibility of combined heat and power
generation, is discussed below.
CHP Generation
CHP, also known as cogeneration, is the generation of both utilizable heat and
electric energy through a single process. This leads to a significant increase in overall
efficiency compared to standalone synchronous generators. Unlike utility based
electricity generation, the energy from CHP systems are generally used locally,
within the customer site where the system is located. CHP systems are practical
and feasible in systems with a simultaneous demand for process steam (or heat) and
electricity, for example, in hospitals and universities, industrial plants, and district
heating applications.
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There are two types of cycles within CHP plants: topping cycle and bottoming
cycle. Topping cycle refers to systems where electrical energy is generated first
followed by the production of useful heat from the rejected exhaust gases or steam
from the previous process. In the case of bottoming cycle the procedure is reversed,
and heat is first generated (usually for an industrial process) and then used to
generate electric power.
1.3.4 Benefits and Costs
Among the various possible benefits of DG, some of the significant ones are ac-
cessibility in remote communities, reduction in feeder loadings, reduced feeder loss,
scalability, reduced costs, environmental sustainability, contribution to voltage sup-
port, and increased reliability. Some approaches to quantify the environmental,
line-loss, voltage profile, power quality and reliability benefits of DG are discussed
in [13] and [14].
Two related benefits of DGs over centralized generation pertain to transmission
of energy: reduced line losses and reduced network congestion [13]. Reduced line
losses result from DG units being typically placed closer to customers than central
generation, thus avoiding the long transmission distances and associated losses.
Depending on the placement of DG units, feeder overloads can also be reduced
through counter-flows on the lines.
DG units, being scalable, can be built to meet immediate needs and later scaled
upwards in capacity to meet future demand growth. This is in contrast to central
generation plants which are designed to accommodate future, foreseeable demand
and are consequently built on a much larger scale. Scalability allows DG units to
reduce their capital and operations costs; large amounts of capital are not tied up
in large investments or in their support infrastructure. Savings can also be achieved
since infrastructure upgrades (such as feeder capacity expansions) can be deferred
or altogether eliminated. From a customer point of view, savings may be accrued
from the additional choice and flexibility that DGs allow with regard to energy
purchases.
DG also has the potential to introduce environmental benefits by reducing emis-
sions – although this depends on the DG technology. However, with the high costs
associated with technologies with low emissions, the environmental benefits may not
be realized until investors are convinced through monetary incentives/disincentives,
from governmental policies, that these are worthwhile investments.
Typically, power transmission over long distances result in voltage drops of
significant magnitude, in the absence of any correction. DG systems can assist in
improving voltage regulation by injecting both real and reactive power close to the
load, thus reducing the transmission losses.
Alleviating voltage dips (sags) and the improvement in load-side voltage profile
are two contributions to voltage support by DG units. Voltage dips are momentary
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decreases in voltage (0.1 - 0.9 pu) over a short period of time (1/2 cycle to 1
minute). These dips are often caused by sudden increase in load (e.g. from starting
machinery, faults) and can result in voltage sensitive equipment failing to operate
properly. Two methods of mitigating voltage dips (both balanced and unbalanced)
using DG units are proposed in [15].
DG units make positive contributions to the reliability and security of distri-
bution systems (where 94% of all faults occur) from the perspective of loads [16],
[13]. In some industries, the value of load lost can be extremely high, almost
$40,000/hour in wireless communication industry and $6.4 M/hour for brokerage
operations [16]. Availability of DG units for back-up power can result in significant
avoided costs to the customer. In [17], Goel and Billington quantify the value of re-
liability by amalgamating reliability indices with the customer cost of interruption
for different industries using three different methods. By quantifying the values,
distribution system planners can include reliability cost in the optimization models.
Despite all the advantages of DG, the addition of DG units can also have nega-
tive impacts to the distribution system, as discussed in [18]. These include service
interruptions if DG units mask load growth (and subsequently inhibits proper plan-
ning) to the point that its loss would result in inadequate supply. Other complex
technical problems introduced by DG include protection coordination, voltage reg-
ulation and flicker, and harmonic problems [19].
1.3.5 Planning and Expansion
The proper planning of distribution systems (especially those with DG) must take
into account the interests of all stakeholders, who must first be identified. One
possible arrangement has the LDC owning as well as operating the DG unit at any
given location. Other arrangements include either a customer or SPP owning and
operating DG within the LDC’s distribution system. Other stakeholders, those that
have an interest in DG or their effects, not necessarily monetary, include federal,
provincial, and municipal governments, the public, environmentalists, etc.
One option for the evaluation of possible DG investments is from a purely mon-
etary point of view. In [20], a method is proposed for determining the break-even
price for utility investments in DG under uncertainty, considering capital, energy,
and environmental costs. Possible methods of measuring the financial impact (from
deferred investment, reduced losses, etc) of DG on distribution systems, from utility
or business point of view, are discussed in [21].
In [22], three major factors – economic, engineering, and financial – are identi-
fied, that have been generally used for the evaluation and planning of DG. Each of
these identified factors comprise multiple parameters, as given in Table 1.2.
In distribution systems planning there exists a significant dichotomy between
research-oriented methods and the experience-based methods put into practice by
industry. The current practice of distribution system designers is to rely on their
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Table 1.2: Factors considered in DG Planning [22]
Economic Engineering Financial
General Economics Generator Regulated Revenues
Regional/Utility Characteristics Capital Expenditure
Characteristics Power Flows Operational Expenditure
Generator Revenue Faults
Generation Capital and Power Quality
Operating Costs and Transients
Generator Operating Security and
Characteristics Reliability
wealth of experience while taking a heuristic approach to the design. However, these
approaches contain some deficiencies as outlined in [3]. These include inaccuracies
in data, suboptimal generation mixes, plans rarely resulting in least cost operation
and investment, neglect of consumer reaction from the planning process, inability to
deal with uncertainty, and failure to account for, analyze, and use private investors
in planning.
1.3.6 Environment
With climate change agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol, environmental emis-
sions (air pollution) has been a topical issue and the focus of attention amongst
politicians and regulators. There are three main components to air pollution from
electricity generation: nitrogen oxide (NOx), carbon dioxide (CO2), and sulphur
dioxide (SO2). NOx and SO2 emissions are responsible for bad air quality (smog)
and acid rain, giving rise to respiratory problems and bad aesthetics. NOx is also
a greenhouse gas, which, along with CO2, may be responsible for climate change
(raising of the earth’s temperature).
In the United States, electrical utilities account for 22% of all NOx emissions
and 38% of all CO2 emissions, the single largest source [23], [24]. Similarly, SO2
emissions are from the use of high sulphur coal for power generation – which is
prevalent in the US and Ontario. Environmentally friendly DG units, such as wind
turbines and solar-PV, can be used to displace polluting bulk generation sources,
thus resulting in a net reduction in emissions.
1.4 Deregulation
Beginning in the late seventies in Chile and early eighties in England, the drive
towards deregulation of the electric power supply industry has transformed the
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way power systems are operated now, all over the world. In Canada, the move to
deregulation was adopted first by Alberta in 1995, followed (partially) by Ontario
in 2002. This shift towards deregulation was often driven by idealogical goals; gov-
ernments pushing for deregulation generally believed in the privatization of public
assets.
It was believed by proponents of deregulation that an open market would re-
sult in economic gains benefiting both investors and consumers. It was thought
that investors, under deregulation, could get higher rates of return and consumers
would pay less for energy, enabled by increased system efficiencies from competition.
Furthermore, deregulation could bring investment into the electricity industry, less-
ening costs to the government. In retrospect the results have been mixed; in some
cases, the exact opposite has occurred.
To accomplish this process of deregulation, financial, organizational, and oper-
ational integration between the elements of the bulk electric power system (gen-
eration, transmission, and distribution) was removed. Generation companies were
allowed to compete for production of energy or set bilateral contracts directly with
brokers or consumers. Transmission companies, because of their very nature, re-
mained a monopoly; however, their relationships with other units were severed in
order to maintain a fair market. Similarly, LDCs were separated from generation
and transmission operators; customers were no longer required to buy energy from
them.
Different goals and objectives have evolved with the change in stakeholders
(e.g. customers, financiers, etc) that deregulation brings. For example, the erst-
while objective of overall system efficiency and seamless integration has given way
to individual efficiency and maximization of profits (or minimization of costs, for
generators and customers respectively), given minimum required reliability levels.
Similarly, tariffs now reflect actual real-time costs as opposed to being averaged out
among users [25]. Some also suggest that power quality and reliability, once con-
sidered unassailable, and the option to shed load are fair play and can be charged
for [25].
The structure of the deregulated market in any given jurisdiction, including the
level of market intervention and regulatory pressures, depends on the government
and its regulators. For example, despite being a competitive market, large energy
producers may act as a monopoly (a by-product of the previously regulated era) or
perhaps energy prices may be fixed for consumers due to government pressure; both
these situations exist in Ontario. The drive towards deregulation is not a single
process but may involve multiple steps.
1.4.1 Implementation
Talati et al. [26] discussed a two-stage process of deregulation – wholesale competi-
tion, followed by retail competition. The electric supply options available to retail
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Table 1.3: Electricity Supply Options in Power Systems
System Structure
Retail Purchase Option Vertically Wholesale Retail
Integrated Competition Competition
Purchase from LDC (fixed tariff) Yes Yes Yes
Self-generation/cogeneration Yes Yes Yes
DSM Yes Yes Yes
Purchase from LDC (real-time pricing) Yes Yes
Purchase from independent system
operator (ISO) or pool
Yes
Purchase from retailer Yes
Bilateral contract with supplier Yes
Load aggregation Yes
Other financial instruments Yes
Wheeling Yes Yes Yes
customers prior to deregulation (in vertically integrated system structure) and in
the case of wholesale and retail competition are outlined in Table 1.3.
In wholesale competition structures, retail (end-use) customers would be re-
quired to buy energy directly from their affiliated distribution company (i.e. no re-
tail competition - the distribution company would retain their monopoly). Choice
would only be available to the distribution companies and large industrial customers
who could either bid for energy from the market operator or purchase energy di-
rectly through bilateral contracts from power producers.
Retail competition on the other hand, provides the most options for end-users,
allowing retail customers to buy power through bilateral contracts, the market,
or through retailers (although the option to buy through distribution companies
would still exist). Many other supply management options also exist, as outlined
in Table 1.3.
The ‘purchase from local utility’ option has traditionally been the default option
in the vertically integrated environment, where customers would purchase power
from their local utility. Self-generation or cogeneration is an option limited to those
customers having their own generation units (e.g. CHP units). DSM, an option
under DER, refers to load management strategies, sometimes with cost subsidies
by the utility. Another option introduced by wholesale markets allows consumers
to buy energy from local utilities based on time of use rates, or real-time prices
correlating to the varying prices that the utilities pay.
Retail competition introduces additional options, including the purchase of
power from the pool, through a retailer, or directly from generation companies.
A collection of loads may also act together for their best interest (known as load
aggregation) to better their market position (and secure better prices). Addition-
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ally, retail consumers may choose to buy their ancillary services unbundled from
their energy costs or participate in hedging or other financial instruments.
1.4.2 Impact on Distribution Systems
The impact of deregulation at the wholesale level is well researched, whereas liter-
ature on the impact that deregulation may have on distribution systems is sparse.
The impact of deregulation on distribution systems may arise through retail trading,
specifically though increased participation by SPPs with DG units. Traditionally,
most distribution systems are radially configured, with power transversing from
the root node to feeder ends. Higher penetration levels of DG may cause these
traditional power flows to change (reverse direction), since with generation from
DG units, power may be injected at any point on the feeder. New planning tech-
niques must ensure that feeders can accommodate changes in load configuration.
Literature in this area has been reviewed in Chapter 2.
With the implementation of retailing and DG, network reconfiguration and dis-
tribution automation is expected to become more prevalent, as this would permit
greater flexibility and control of the distribution system [27]. To permit greater flex-
ibility, protection and control devices must be configured or upgraded to accommo-
date network reconfiguration, including the accommodation of reverse power flows.
Appropriate policies should be put in place to allow operation of the distribution
system in islanded mode (isolation of a small portion of the grid while maintaining
electric supply within) [28]; consequently, additional protection must also address
equipment and worker safety and be able to provide appropriate protection during
such operation.
Other possible changes resulting from deregulation [25] include increased impor-
tance on demands from customers for power quality and reliability, possibly leading
to performance based rates. It should also be kept in mind that competition and the
drive for profit may result in higher equipment loading, and consequently increased
equipment failure [27].
1.5 Research Motivation and Goals
A number of factors have been driving changes to distribution systems, subsequently
creating a need to examine different aspects of its planning. Advances in DG
technology has made its penetration into distribution systems feasible for both
LDCs and SPPs. Furthermore, deregulation has opened up distribution systems to
SPPs willing to invest in DG. Also, renewable and clean energy DG technologies
are seen as having benefits to the environment, and thus policies are being enacted
to encourage their investment in distribution systems.
Investment in DG, and its subsequent implementation within the distribution
system, requires the involvement of three major stakeholders: the LDC, SPPs, and
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regulators. It is within the LDC’s system that DG units are installed and hence it
must plan its infrastructure so as to accommodate DG units considering the options
of either installing its own DG or connecting SPP-DG units. SPPs are potential
investors of DG; anything that may impact their ability to install DG units, or their
rate of return, will be of interest to it. Government regulators (which, by extension,
encompasses consumers) are also keenly involved in DG investments, as they play
key roles in meeting market deregulation and/or environmental emission reduction
goals.
LDCs are required to adhere to regulations set by regulatory agencies, and
thus may have limited control over DG investments. As stated earlier, LDCs may
be able to invest in their own DG and/or be forced to connect SPP-DG units.
SPPs investments, on the other hand, may fall under the jurisdiction of both the
governmental regulators and LDCs. Regulators will determine whether they are
permitted to participate in electricity generation, and the rules and incentives under
which they participate. SPPs may also be required to work with LDCs to reach
mutually beneficial solutions to DG investment problems.
The design and planning of distribution systems focused on DG unit investment
is a complex problem, especially when considering that the major stakeholders have
different technical and economic directives and goals. The objective of this research
is to broadly analyze some aspects of this design and planning problem from the
viewpoint of the different stakeholders.
The goals of this research, realizing this multifaceted approach, are described
as follows:
• The first goal is to examine the LDC’s long term distribution system planning
problem taking into account DG unit options, and to propose a comprehensive
framework for solving the problem that will assist in understanding the role
of DG and the impact it has on the distribution system.
– The framework incorporates traditional planning elements, including the
optimal sizing, placement, and upgrading of feeders and substations.
– DG units, including those invested in by the LDC and forced onto the
LDC by SPPs, are included as possible options to address the complex
issues arising from the deregulated environment.
– The impact of external factors, such as taxes, regulatory policy, market
prices, and environmental factors, should be able to be determined from
the framework.
• Since it is realized that LDCs may have little control in the adoption and
implementation of DG, the second goal of this research is to examine policy
instruments that may be employed by government regulators and the long
term impact that the policies may have on the distribution system.
– As part of the analysis, a simplified distribution system model is con-
sidered, based on the comprehensive framework proposed earlier and
geared towards extensive case study and scenario analysis.
15
– These case studies examine both deregulated and vertically-integrated
distribution systems, in light of DG investment incentives and emissions
reduction mechanisms.
– The resultant impacts on DG investments, energy dispatch/purchase
decisions, and emissions from the various policies are studied.
• The final goal is to propose a method for coordinating SPP-DG proposals
should policy instruments enacted by regulatory agencies become effective in
encouraging investment in DG beyond the means of the LDC to implement
them.
– The proposed method is able to help regulators and LDCs realize the
full potential of DG.
– The method is fair and transparent to both the LDC and SPPs.
1.6 Outline of Thesis
A review of literature on research pertaining to the topics of this thesis is presented
in Chapter 2, covering the following areas: distribution system planning, planning
in deregulation, and DG policies and impacts.
Chapter 3 presents a two-stage, hierarchical dynamic optimization framework
to address the planning and energy scheduling problem in power distribution sys-
tems. The framework is geared towards solving large, long-term distribution sys-
tem planning problems, and can take into consideration complex issues arising from
deregulation and environmental policies. It is applied to the planning problem of
a 32-bus radial distribution system, and the results from the application of four
different policy scenarios are developed and discussed.
Chapter 4 examines the policies that can be used to encourage DG investment
and incorporates them into a mathematical model. This model is then used to cre-
ate scenarios for examining the economic and environmental supply-side effects of
policies applicable to distribution systems over a ten year period. The policies ana-
lyzed include a combination of feed-in-tariffs, CO2 tax, and cap-and-trade schemes.
The results are discussed in the context of the Ontario market and its Standard
Offer Program, implemented on a 32-bus radial distribution system.
Chapter 5 proposes a systematic approach for the coordination and selection
of DG unit investment proposals submitted by multiple, competing, SPPs. It uses
a feedback mechanism between the LDC and SPPs to achieve maximum investor
participation while complying with the technical operational limits of the LDC.
The concept of commons and domains is used to identify the largest transgressors
to system function, and forms the basis for revisions to SPPs proposals. This
application of the scheme, and the resultant effects, is demonstrated on a 32-bus
radial distribution system.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of the research in this thesis,





Operations research (OR) techniques were first applied to distribution system de-
sign and planning problems in the mid-1970’s. Initial research focused on ‘tradi-
tional’ planning problems – the placement of substations and routing of feeders to
minimize costs and losses to the LDC. Since then, the approaches taken to optimal
distribution system design and planning have grown more comprehensive and so-
phisticated, driven by both changes in the tools available to researchers and changes
to distribution systems themselves. Advances in OR methods and computational
abilities have permitted detailed modelling of system elements, allowing, for ex-
ample, modelling of non-linear representations of loads and power flows. Faster
computers have also allowed for superior solutions, and risk and uncertainty issues
can now be addressed.
In addition to new tools, research has been driven by the evolution of distribu-
tion systems due to changes in technology and policy. One of the most significant
changes has come through the introduction and widespread acceptance of DG: small
generation resources connected to the distribution system. Investment in DG may
either be made by small power producers or the LDC, with distinct planning require-
ments for each. Major policy changes have come from deregulation of the power
industry and increased environmental awareness. With the onset of deregulation,
the planning problems have become more market-oriented, capable of considering
multiple resources of energy rather than just utility resources. Finally, environmen-
tal issues have driven policy changes, resulting in governments encouraging clean
and renewable energy integration into distribution system planning.
This literature review is divided into three thematic areas. The first section
reviews planning problems related to traditional distribution system planning (in-
cluding uncertainty and reliability issues and solution algorithms). Next, a review
of literature on distribution planning in the context of deregulation, where DG plays
an important role, is presented. Finally, a review of research investigating the im-
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pact of policies influencing investment in DG resources in distribution systems is
presented.
2.2 Distribution System Planning
2.2.1 Traditional Distribution System Planning
This section makes a modest attempt to discuss some of the approaches adopted
and reported in the literature addressing the traditional distribution system plan-
ning problem. A number of models proposed and published in the literature con-
sider the traditional problem of power distribution system design: the placement of
substations and feeders in the primary system to meet non-uniform loads. These
models, while sharing certain commonalities, approach the problem in a number of
ways. This literature review discusses models that can be used for long (or hori-
zon) range planning, with some applicable to short range planning. The models are
classified as single-stage (single build period) or multi-stage (continuous construc-
tion over multiple years), with the objective function and/or constraints forming
either linear programming (LP) or non-linear programming (NLP) models. Earlier
models tended to be simplistic owing to the lack of powerful solution algorithms or
computational power available.
Delson and Shahidehpour discussed the role of linear programming (including
Bender’s decomposition) and dynamic programming techniques to power system
planning in [29]. They recommended that the linear, master program should be
responsible for capital investment decisions, and the subproblem, needing only to
be convex, should be responsible for production costing. Although this work was
intended for evaluating large generator investments, it can be applied to distribution
systems in deregulated environment that mimic the capital and production costing
of their larger cousins.
Khator and Leung [30] discussed the general issues of power distribution system
planning with an overview of some relevant models and prior work. They classi-
fied distribution planning problems into two categories: planning under normal
conditions and planning considering contingencies. In their work, the authors also
justified the superiority of multi-period (dynamic) models over single-period models
(and their variations) in achieving optimal solutions.
The integration of a Geographic Information System (GIS) into distribution
planning is discussed by Yeh et al., in [31]. The concepts of long-range and short-
range planning are introduced and the co-ordination between them is discussed. In
essence, long-range planning sets a direction for short range planning exercises to
follow. In the long range (10 years), location of installations are determined, while
in the short range (3 years) size and the year of installation are finalized (from their
initial solutions obtained in the long-range plan).
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Holt and Crawford [32] introduced one of the first distribution system planning
models using OR techniques: a single-stage LP. The objective function minimizes
the load along a feeder multiplied by the fixed per unit (MW) cost of the feeder.
Feeder paths, from substation to load, are determined using Dijkstra’s minimum
path algorithm, and Ford and Fulkerson’s transportation algorithm are used to
determine power flows. This formulation ignored the ability of a single feeder to
feed multiple loads along its path.
Wall et al. [33] used a transshipment (a variation of network flows) formu-
lation to model power flows, thereby avoiding the problems of [32]. They also
used a single period and linear model, minimizing either load × distance, load ×
resistance (losses), or load × cost. The authors advanced their previous model,
in [34], by including the substation siting aspects to arrive at a mixed integer linear
program (MILP).
A comprehensive review of models created before 1986, that addressed the tra-
ditional distribution planning problem, was presented by Gönen et al., in [35]. This
review compared the mathematical formulation of models and their treatment of
element costs and characteristics. The authors further proposed a MILP model [36]
to solve the multi-stage planning and expansion of existing infrastructure problem.
A major feature of the work is the use of linear approximations to the cost of
investments and energy losses in the objective function, along with its ability to
solve both feeder and substation expansion problems simultaneously. A review is
provided in [37] to compare existing models from a computational perspective, e.g.
the amount of resources, data required.
Whereas in [35] and [36] a completely dynamic model was presented, the au-
thors in [38] presented a pseudodynamic model which otherwise retained the same
characteristics of the prior dynamic model. In this pseudodynamic model, the fi-
nal design solution at the horizon year is achieved first, followed by incrementing
from the first year to the horizon year minus one to meet demand in each year,
incorporating elements of final design solution until it is fulfilled.
Most models, up to this point, used linear cost terms. Ponnavaikki et al., in [39],
proposed using a quadratic representation of costs from feeder losses in combination
with fixed capital cost terms. To solve the model the authors devised a two stage
method: the first stage is used to fix substation locations; the second stage is used
to find the optimal set of feeder branch elements.
Blanchard et al., in [40], modelled the traditional distribution system planning
problem using non-linear cost terms (but kept the linear transshipment power flows)
as a mixed integer non-linear program (MINLP). The authors then proposed a 5-
phase computational method to solve the problem using linearized approximations
of the cost function while removing radiality constraints. Only the the first 2 phases
were discussed in this paper.
To address the complexity of discrete non-linear problems, Temraz and Salama,
in [41], presented a cost objective function that substitutes the binary variables
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Objective Function:
• Discounted cost of new feeders and/or existing feeder capacity up-
grades
• Discounted cost of new substations and/or substation capacity up-
grades
• Discounted cost of losses
Subject to:
• Linear network flows (peak load for each year) for nodal demand-
supply balance
• Line power flow constrained by feeder and substation capacity, con-
sidering peak demand state
• Feeder and substation capacity constrained by existing and new
builds
• Feeder and substation new builds and upgrades constrained by max-
imum capacity
• Voltage drop constraints
Decision Variables:
• Feeder: siting, (new) capacity, year of installation
• Substation: siting, (new) capacity, year of installation
Figure 2.1: Generic Traditional Distribution System Planning Model
usually seen in MILP models with an exponential term. Additionally, this model
uses ac power flows and has an ability to minimize costs through element upgrades,
rather than just the installation of entirely new elements.
The typical distribution system planning model is represented in Figure 2.1.
This model forms the basis for most modern research in distribution system plan-
ning.
Fletcher and Strunz, in [42] (and applied subsequently in [43]), formulated a
primary and secondary distribution system planning model, with emphasis on sub-
station and feeder numbering, selection of appropriate voltage level, and sizing of
feeder length and capacity. Unlike the models represented in Fig. 2.1, this work
uses circular topologies to represent uniform loads served by individual substa-
tions, assuming that substations are placed in the centre of feeders which radiate
outwards.
2.2.2 Distribution System Planning in Deregulation
It has been observed that with the advent of deregulation, traditional distribution
planning models have undergone a paradigm change to address the various issues
arising therefrom. This section discusses various proposals for optimal distribution
planning in such deregulated environments.
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A number of developments in the electric power industry have rendered the
erstwhile, traditional long-range planning techniques obsolete in many jurisdictions
which have undergone restructuring. Deregulation of the electric utilities has re-
quired that not only capital costs and losses be considered in the objective function,
as before, but also energy costs. Advancement in DG technology has also made
generation within distribution systems more widely available, forcing LDCs to con-
sider placing their own DG units or integrate SPP (or customer) owned DG units.
Newer models of distribution system planning introduced alternatives to the tra-
ditional methods by adding interties and utility DG’s as possible options to meet
demand. However, initial research focused solely on the placement of DG units and
not planning of the distribution system as a whole.
Chowdhury et al., in [44], presented a DG investment model based on such
a concept using various reliability indices in order to determine the optimal DG
locations and sizes. Their studies revealed that, although DG investments are
more expensive than distribution system upgrades, these can be cost effective in
combination with capital deferral credit.
In [45], Bender’s decomposition is used to optimally site distributed resources
within the transmission system while considering the stochastic nature of gener-
ator production. Three separate modules are used: one for the modelling of the
bulk generation and transmission system operations, another for the planning of
transmission and generation assets, and the third for the placement of distributed
resources.
While the previous work, [45], proposed a method for placing distributed re-
sources considering uncertainty in generation, Haghifam et al., in [46], proposed
a method for placing DG units considering uncertainty in load. Using a multi-
objective function, DG units are sited with the objective of minimizing costs, tech-
nical risks (from the overloading of substations and feeders or exceeding voltage
limits), and economic risks (from the uncertainties in electricity price). The final
solution is a set of Pareto-optimal options from which the planner could choose the
most suitable one.
In contrast to previous models using constant load models, Singh et al. [47]
examined the use of different load models, finding that the choice of models has a
significant impact on the optimal planning of DG. Using voltage dependent load
modelling, it is shown that system reactive power demand increases, negating the
effect of decreased losses. The foundations established in [47] were used in [48] to
the develop a multi-objective model for the siting and sizing of a single DG unit.
Whereas the aforementioned research concentrated solely on the planning of DG,
El-Khattam et al. introduced two methods for the planning of DG units and the
host distribution system, from the point of view of the LDC. The first method [49]
is a (step-by-step) heuristic approach to DG investment planning that uses an
optimization model at each step. In meeting demand requirements the LDC has
three options: purchase power from the grid, install DG capacity, or shed load. The
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mathematical objective function included investment and operating costs, energy
import costs, unserved power costs, and losses. In essence, the algorithm examined
the benefit/cost ratio of each possible DG unit option and selects those with a net
benefit. However, this model does not incorporate the ‘planning over time’ aspect
of distribution planning – which usually span a horizon of 5-15 years.
The second model [50] uses a single optimization model to avoid the use of the
heuristics. Using the same concepts, but with binary variables, the problem at-
tempts to minimize the cost of supplying the demand by either purchasing power
from the main grid, purchasing power from interties, or investing in DG. The plan-
ner is allowed to upgrade substations and feeder capacity.
A generic market-oriented planning model is presented in Figure 2.2. Note that
none of the previously discussed research incorporates SPP-owned DG where the
LDC has little or no say in the commission or operation of DG units.
2.2.3 Inclusion of Uncertainty and Reliability Issues
Some researchers explicitly addressed the issues of uncertainty and reliability in
distribution system planning. However, generalized approaches to finding optimal
solutions considering uncertainty can also be found in OR journals without specific
application to distribution planning.
The majority of models discussed in this chapter are deterministic, in which
a single plan is built using ‘best estimates’ for future data. Gorenstin et al. [51]
introduced multiple methods of distribution planning with uncertainty which in-
cluded scenario based planning and planning using stochastic optimization. In the
scenario planning approach [51], solutions are conceived for all possible scenarios;
afterwards, a single plan is chosen that best fits all solutions. A single best fit
plan, it was stated, is difficult to find. In the stochastic optimization approach,
multiple scenarios are incorporated into a single model, so that a best fit plan can
be derived. This formulation requires that some decision variables be set, such as
investments, before the final scenario is known (and uncertainties resolved). The
objective function can either be the minimization of expected costs, or minimizing
the maximum regret (which is advocated in [52]).
In [53], a method is devised for the optimal selection of candidate substation
sites in a given area using probability distributions. Similar to [42], this approach
takes a topological approach to placement of substations, as opposed to explicitly
considering feeder paths and routing. Outage and switching equipment costs are
included in the basic objective function in [54] to account for reliability (switching)
issues in planning, whereas in [55] a comprehensive contingency analysis of multiple
system elements is incorporated within the planning problem.
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Objective Function (various combinations of):
• Discounted cost of new feeders and/or existing feeder capacity up-
grades
• Discounted cost of new substations and/or substation capacity up-
grades
• Discounted cost of new intertie and/or existing intertie capacity
upgrades
• Discounted cost of new DG and/or DG capacity upgrades
• Discounted cost of energy from grid purchase
• Discounted cost of energy from intertie purchase
• Discounted cost of energy from DG
Subject to:
• Network flows (linear or ac power flow) for nodal demand-supply
balance, including losses
• Line power flow constrained by feeder, substation, intertie, and DG
capacity
• Feeder, substation, intertie, and DG capacity constrained by exist-
ing and new builds
• Feeder, substation, intertie, and DG new builds and upgrades con-
strained by maximum capacity
• Voltage drop constraints
Decision Variables:
• Feeder: siting, (new) capacity, year of installation
• Substation, intertie, and utility DG: siting, (new) capacity, year of
installation
• Grid and intertie energy purchase from market or other LDCs
• Utility DG: energy production schedule
Figure 2.2: Generic Distribution System Planning Model for a Deregulated Envi-
ronment
2.2.4 Solution Algorithms
As computational power and OR algorithms improved, the complexity of the dis-
tribution system planning models also became more complex and difficult to solve.
By the early 1990’s, research literature focusing on application of OR algorithms
to solve the planning problem efficiently and optimally began to appear.
Initial research dwelt on solving single period or simplified multi-period plan-
ning problems. Aoki et al. [56] proposed solving a single period MILP model by
combining pivoting methods within the simplex tableau with the branch exchange
technique. This technique was further advanced in [57] to include simplified multi-
period planning, with individual solutions found for each year and integrated though
forward and backward paths. In [58] a multi-stage branch exchange technique
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(rather than a combination of single stages as in [57]) is used to solve the same
problem and in [59], branch and bound techniques in combination with heuristics
is used to obtain a radial distribution plan solution for the MINLP single-stage
problem. Branch exchange is also used in [60] to determine, in two stages, the
optimal substation service areas and network configuration.
Pseudodynamic approaches were also used by researchers to resolve the compu-
tational burden involved in finding optimal solutions to the distribution planning
problem. Quintana et al. [61] proposed a two-stage technique to solve a NLP model
similar to that in [41], in which the first stage is responsible for load forecasting
and the second uses a pseudodynamic algorithm to find the multi-year solution. A
pseudodynamic solution was proposed, in [62], for the traditional planning problem
using genetic algorithms (GA); it was shown that pseudodynamic approaches are
generally better at finding optimal solutions than non-dynamic approaches.
The use of GA to solve difficult distribution planning problems is commonly
cited in the literature. In [63], GA is used to solve dynamic multi-stage planning
problems with favourable results. Using GA in combination with other techniques
and heuristics to improve planning solutions is explored in [64]. Adaptations of
GA to the distribution planning problem are further advanced in [65]. In [66], the
authors presented a two-stage method using GA. The first stage optimally sites
and sizes medium-voltage substations, which in turn is used as input to the second
stage to optimally site and size high-voltage substations and determine medium
voltage feeder routing.
Other, less common solution algorithms have been cited in literature. A steep-
est descent approach is first used in [67] for generating the initial plan for a new,
radially-configured distribution system. Simulated annealing techniques are then
applied to find the optimal solution, with the object of reducing costs associated
with feeder routing. The potential role of knowledge based systems in designing ru-
ral distribution systems is reviewed in [68]. A directed graph formulation approach
is used in [69] to solve a multi-stage planning problem.
2.3 DG Policies and Impacts
The penetration of DG into distribution systems has been fostered by technological
progress coupled with widespread regulatory acceptance and incentive programs.
Deregulation of the power industry has opened the sector to increased investments
in DG from private parties. The push from governments and consumers to find
environmentally sustainable resources of energy is further driving the penetration
of those DG that are seen as clean or renewable, and are often the subject of
additional incentives encouraging investment.
This section first reviews policy instruments that have been commonly em-
ployed by governments and their regulatory agencies and their ability to reach
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their intended goals. The second part of this section reviews literature dealing
with measuring the impact of DG, with the goal of assessing charges or credits to
participating entities.
2.3.1 Policy Instruments
Three policy instruments, tender/bidding, tradable green certificate (TGC) or re-
newable energy certificate (REC) trading, and feed-in tariffs (FITs), are commonly
cited as being employed by regulators to achieve goals of meeting electricity demand
with clean or renewable energy resources [70], [71].
Under a tender/bidding system, the regulator establishes a quota for energy
to be supplied by renewable generation. Potential investors are then invited to
submit proposals/bids, in $/MWh, for renewable energy contracts to meet this
demand. Proposals are then ordered by cost, from the lowest to highest, and
contracts awarded until the quota is met; winners are paid as-bid. The United
Kingdom’s Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) is an example of a tender/bidding
system.
In a TGC/REC system, distributors, retailers, and/or customers must meet
a percentage of their energy consumption, as set by regulators, from clean or re-
newable energy resources. This is achieved by attaining the requisite amount of
TGCs/RECs which can be either earned through self-generation or purchased from
a renewables market. TGCs/RECs are awarded to qualifying generators, who may
then retain them, trade via a renewables market, or sell to other operators. This
system is employed nationally in Australia and Sweden (among others) [72], [73].
Jurisdictions offering FITs give additional incentives to qualifying generators by
paying for energy at prices greater than the market rate. FITs may be differentiated
based on technology or time-of-use and may be guaranteed, via contract, over long
periods, e.g. 20 years. In [74], an extensive analysis of FIT implementation in Spain
was conducted, examining its development and what made it effective. Amongst
the conclusions reached is that, to be effective, FIT programs should be perceived
as stable by participants and thus not undergo significant policy shifts or frequent
program changes. FITs are offered in Ontario, Canada, as well as many European
countries [75].
Significant research has been carried out to analyze these three policy instru-
ments and their ability to achieve their stated goals, with FIT mechanisms usually
the preferred option. In [70], FITs are favoured from amongst the three policy in-
struments for achieving the penetration targets set for renewable energy technolo-
gies. It is recognized that, while controlling the program cost of FITs is difficult
and may not stimulate drops in technology prices, FITs are effective because of the
stability and security they offer to potential investors.
In [76], the Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) (a variation of the TGC/REC
mechanism) was compared to FIT programs using empirical evidence from three
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countries: Denmark, Germany, and the UK. After examining penetration, con-
tribution to carbon reduction, and employment effects of the programs, it was
concluded that FITs are best at achieving penetration and employment targets
(with mixed results on carbon reduction). Although this study is based only on
a small sample size of three countries, its conclusion is reaffirmed in [77], where
it is shown that TGC/REC mechanisms encourage investment in incumbent tech-
nologies rather than emerging technologies, therefore ending up being costlier in
the long-run. In a comparison of FIT programs and the EU’s proposed TGC sys-
tem, [75], it is again recommended that FITs be pursued, because of their speed in
achieving investment goals and the level playing field they present to the industry.
Despite the purported superiority of FITs established in the research literature,
both FITs and TGC/REC are favoured by governments worldwide.
In addition to comparisons of different FIT mechanisms, some works have an-
alyzed the implementation of FIT mechanisms. For example, an examination of
different policy instruments in EU countries to encourage wind investments reported
that the most successful have been in jurisdictions offering a combination of FITs
and subsidies [78]. In [79], FITs, based on the old Danish ‘triple tariff’ (time-of-use)
system, are recommended to encourage CHP with district heating. In contrast to
the trend of offering FITs to encourage renewable energy, [80] recommended the
slashing of FITs for solar energy, claiming that it does not reduce emissions nor
increase employment.
In order to find the best ways to promote renewable energy and energy efficiency,
Sovacool, in [81], conducted extensive interviews amongst many different stakehold-
ers for their opinion. In addition to favouring FITs, as discussed above, participants
were found to favour elimination of subsidies for established technologies (such as
those using fossil fuels), pricing electricity accurately (e.g. eliminating price caps
or declining-block pricing in favour of time-of-use schemes), and education.
Econometric modelling, in [82], of data from the United States is used to eval-
uate the impact of various policies on DG implementation within distribution sys-
tems, distinguishing between private and public-utility distribution systems and
consumer and utility-owned DG. It is observed that private-utilities typically have
higher distribution costs and lower reliability than public-utilities, and thus are
more willing to adopt DG because of the improvements they can bring. Further-
more explaining the difference in adoption rates, it was found that policies within
the U.S. mandating DG adoption are more geared towards private-utilities; public
utilities are often exempted.
2.3.2 Quantifying the Impact of DG
FITs and other policy instruments discussed above are focused on encouraging in-
vestment in environmentally friendly technology such as CHP, solar-PV, etc. How-
ever, these policies do not explicitly take into account the effects they will have
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on the distribution system from DG investments. There is a need for devising
additional mechanisms for such DG investment to suit the individual distribution
systems in light of FITs and other policy instruments.
In [83], the authors presented a single period model for distribution system
planning. This model, which minimizes capital, loss, and unserved energy costs, is
used for finding the annualized fixed charge rate (AFCR), assessed to loads, under
two conditions: with and without the DG units. The AFCRs of the two states
(with and without DG) are compared to determine the annual avoided charge rate
(AACR) of DG (which may be positive or negative).
Gil et al., in [84], proposed simple mathematical models for quantifying the ben-
efits of DG units to LDCs and the power system operator/society. Modelled LDC
benefits include investment deferrals, avoided electricity purchases, and loss reduc-
tion. The authors proposed that utilities offer paybacks (benefits minus connection
costs) to private-DG or build their own DG units.
To the best of this author’s knowledge, there has been no work so far on devis-
ing DG investment coordination mechanisms where the LDC has no stake in the
investments and only provides the network service.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter makes a modest attempt to present a review of literature on distri-
bution system planning. In the first section a review of methods for solving the
distribution system planning problem is presented. Thereafter, an extensive review
of policies encouraging investments in environmentally friendly distributed genera-
tion technologies is presented. Literature justifying the use of FITs are presented;
it has been observed that FITs are widely accepted and are superior to other green-
energy policy instruments. However, although FITs affect placement of DG and
thus distribution systems, there has been no work on devising DG investment co-
ordination mechanisms where the LDC has no stake in the investments and only




with DG in a Deregulated
Environment1
3.1 Introduction
As described in Chapters 1 and 2, deregulation of the power industry and conse-
quent penetration of DG has forced a paradigm shift in distribution system design
and planning. In this new environment, both LDCs and SPPs play a role in distri-
bution system investment; the minimization of energy costs is now important and
must be considered alongside alternative supply options such as DG.
This chapter introduces a framework for the comprehensive planning of the
distribution system, by the LDC, relevant in today’s environment. The proposed
distribution system planning framework presented
a) incorporates various energy supply options for LDCs such as DGs and inter-
ties, and determines the near-optimal sizing, placement and upgrade plans
for feeders and substations,
b) addresses the complex issues arising from the deregulated environment, such
as the availability of a variety of energy sources at different costs (including
SPP investments in DG that are not controlled by the LDC),
c) examines the impact of external factors, such as taxes, regulatory policy,
market prices, and environmental considerations, on LDC planning.
1The work presented in this chapter has been accepted for publication and will appear in S.
Wong, K. Bhattacharya, and J.D. Fuller, “Electric power distribution system design and planning
in a deregulated environment,” IET Generation, Transmission, and Distribution, In Press. An
earlier version of this work has been presented and appears in S. Wong, K. Bhattacharya and J.D.
Fuller, “Comprehensive framework for long-term distribution system planning,” Proc. IEEE PES
Annual General Meeting, Tampa, USA, 2007.
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The gap between traditional OR-based planning techniques and DG siting
methodology are addressed by this framework. It is very detailed and improves
upon previous research, carrying a number of features; the framework
a) is fully dynamic; commissioning of elements vary by size and year,
b) optimizes feeder layout; layout may be radial or networked,
c) permits both LDC and SPP-DG unit, where the latter includes near-optimal
siting (if possible),
d) models various types of DG technology, taking into account varying costs
and capacity factors,
e) accommodates multiple load demand blocks: base, intermediate, and peak,
and
f) can be used for large systems, incorporating a two-stage process to improve
solvability.
In Section 3.2, an overview of the proposed distribution system planning frame-
work is presented. This is followed by the mathematical modelling of the associated
optimization models in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. While this modelling (Sections 3.3 and
3.4) forms the heart of this work, the mathematics is very detailed. In Sections 3.5
and 3.6, the detailed plan studies and results considering a 32-bus radial distribu-
tion system implemented under multiple policy sets are presented.
3.2 Proposed Distribution Planning Framework
Ideally, one comprehensive MINLP model would suffice to solve the distribution
system planning problem, and was initially considered. However, such a formulation
was computationally very intensive and often failed to arrive at a feasible and nearly
optimal solution due to complexities of the non-linearities and the presence of binary
variables in the model.
A two-level hierarchical scheme of inter-related models is therefore proposed
that imitates the decision making process of the real-world planning: a Siting-cum-
Period Planning Model (SPPM) and a Capacity-cum-Production Planning Model
(CPPM). The SPPM is a MILP model that determines the near-optimal period
and location of resource installation over the planning horizon of 10 years, and can
be used ahead-of-time to obtain land-rights, permits, etc. The CPPM is a NLP
model that determines the near-optimal unit capacities and production/contract
schedules and makes any necessary changes to the SPPM’s recommendations.
The proposed distribution system planning scheme (Fig. 3.1), is executed in two
stages – the SPPM is solved first, after which its results are fed into the CPPM to
arrive at a comprehensive plan. Information transferred to the CPPM includes a set
of final and firm decisions on siting and period of commissioning of infrastructure
investments determined in the SPPM. This alleviates the need for binary variables
in the CPPM. In its place, a more detailed cost and power flow representation
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 Figure 3.1: Proposed Distribution Planning Framework
can be incorporated, thus rendering the CPPM a NLP model. It should be noted
that the energy production schedule obtained from the SPPM is temporary and
is revised in the CPPM. The additional accuracy in modelling is introduced in
the CPPM plan to more closely reflect the required investments and production
schedules.
A planner would typically use the two stages of the framework in tandem,
though in some cases the CPPM can be executed independent of the SPPM. The
SPPM is suitable for 10-year distribution system planning since it can provide the
long lead-times required for infrastructure investments (e.g. when procuring sites
or right-of-ways). However, as the future plays out, modifications to capacities and
production/contract schedules may be necessary, which is carried out using the
CPPM executed annually through the 10-year plan horizon; important since the
demand and price forecasts used in the SPPM may not be very accurate and need
to be improved in the near-term.
Obtaining accurate long-term spatial forecasts is a key step in this distribution
system planning process, and is required by both the SPPM and CPPM to provide
the distribution system planner a good, near-optimal plan. Willis et al., in [85]
identified two approaches for obtaining these forecasts: trending, where forecasts
of future demands are based on historical data; and land-use, where forecasts are
based on the anticipated use of the area in question, i.e. zoning, such as residential,
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commercial, or industrial, etc. This work does not undertake any load forecasting
exercise in order to focus more on the planning aspect of the problem. In the test
system discussed later, load has been approximated to grow at a constant rate.
3.2.1 Siting-cum-Period Planning Model (SPPM)
The goal of the SPPM is to determine the optimum level of future distribution
system investments over a period of 10 years. Output from the SPPM subsequently
serves as an input to the CPPM, setting bounds on its decision variables.
The SPPM’s inputs include the demand at each bus, estimated/forecast for
each year up to horizon. It also encompasses information on available resources
and their characteristics such as their unit capital and energy costs as well as their
market prices. Policy inputs include the regulatory constraints in place, acceptable
discount rates, emissions taxes and caps, budgets, etc. Decisions are made in the
SPPM on the near-optimal mix of resources to be installed as well as their siting
and dates of commissioning. Tentative decisions are also made for each resource’s
energy production schedule – the outcome of which is passed to the CPPM, for
refinement.
3.2.2 Capacity-cum-Production Planning Model (CPPM)
This model uses the SPPM’s output, along with annual demand and price fore-
casts, to build a detailed planning model with accurate representation of feeder
power flows and losses. Adjustments to feeder investments in networked distribu-
tion systems may also be made in this stage, since the SPPM is not as robust used
in this configuration as it is for radial distribution systems (see Section 3.4.4).
To meet the LDC’s goal of cost optimality, the CPPM closely follows the results
obtained from the SPPM, adhering to resource installation timing and siting and
upper and lower bounds on sizing, above and below the SPPM sizes. The detailed
power flow modelling in the CPPM also requires additional, separate data: ini-
tial feeder impedances and any revised impedances resulting from upgrades. The
CPPM determines near-optimal resource investment capacity and annual produc-
tion/contract schedules across load blocks. Any differences from the SPPM emanate
from the CPPM’s more accurate modelling of power flows and clearer outlook on
future scenarios.
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3.3 SPPM: Mathematical Description
3.3.1 Objective Function
The objective function, J1 in (3.1), is the present value of the total system cost of
distribution system investments over the planning horizon from the viewpoint of
the LDC. The present values are calculated using different discount rates for capital
and energy cost components (RLDC.c and RLDC.e respectively), because the planner
may perceive different risk levels for each. The objective function is discussed in


























































































The engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) costs and capacity costs of
feeder placement are represented in a○.2 The EPC cost of a feeder is dependent
on its length Le and the geographic multiplier Ge representing location dependent
features (e.g. a pre-existing right-of-way will be assigned a low Ge value while a
remote connectivity will have high Ge). The EPC and capacity costs for substation
and intertie builds are represented by the terms b○ and c○, respectively. The capital
cost of utility owned DG, which varies by technology, is given in d○. Capital costs
of SPP-DG units are not considered in (3.1) as they are not paid for by the LDC.
Note that builds may be at new or existing sites.
Energy Purchase and Production Costs, Emissions Costs
The cost to the LDC for importing energy from the external grid/electricity market
via substations is given in line e○ while line f○ denotes the cost of power imported
from neighbouring discos via interties. The LDC’s cost of operating its own DG is
given in line g○. Line h○ represents the cost of energy purchased by the LDC from
SPP-DG assumed to be based on a contract price fixed a priori.
The costs arising from a CO2 tax scheme, that may be enforced by the govern-
ment, is in line i○. It can either represent a strict tax where all CO2 emissions are
taxed or a ‘cap and tax’ scheme where CO2 emissions over a certain allowable limit
are taxed, as will be discussed in the context of CO2 emission constraints.
Finally, the last term j○ is the revenue earned by the LDC for power exports
to the grid via substations.
3.3.2 Constraints
Nodal Power Balance
A linear power flow representation (3.2) is used in this stage, which requires lesser
computation to find an optimum solution than non-linear representations. Feeder
losses are approximated by a loss factor, Llfdr(i,j),t, and are accounted for in the
incoming power flow direction at the bus. Reserve margins are included as part
of nodal demand. Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4) ensure that the net power flow on a given
feeder is in one direction only. Note that, for accounting purposes, exports and
imports are regarded as separate transactions.
2The notation i, j ∈ N : ∃(i, j) under the summation restricts the combinations of (i, j) to




















∀i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (3.2)
P fdr(i,j),b,t ≤ Mz
pf
(i,j),b,t ∀i, j ∈ N : ∃ (i, j) (3.3)
P fdr(j,i),b,t ≤ M(1 − z
pf
(i,j),b,t) ∀i, j ∈ N : ∃ (i, j) (3.4)
P fdr(i,j),b,t ≥ 0 ∀i, j ∈ N : ∃ (i, j) (3.5)
Feeder Capacity Limits
Feeder thermal limits (3.6) are imposed to limit the loading of feeders; these limits
take into consideration the new feeder investments, in (3.7). A step increase in
feeder capacity, W fdr.st, sets the initial capacity at year-0 as well as at the end of










∀i, j ∈ N : ∃ (i, j), b ∈ B, t ∈ T (3.6)
wfdr(i,j),t ≤ Mz
fdr
(i,j),t ∀i, j ∈ N : ∃ (i, j), t ∈ T (3.7)
Capacity Adequacy Limits
The capacity adequacy constraint (3.8) ensures enough capacity in the system so
that power can be maintained during peak hours in case of equipment failure. This
constraint ensures that 80% of substation and intertie capacity, in addition to DG
capacity adjusted for their expected capacity factor, (ECF), is adequate to meet
































(1 + Rs)Pdi,′peak′,t ∀t ∈ T (3.8)
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Substation Capacity Limits
Energy purchased from the external grid/electricity market is transferred to the dis-
tribution system via substations, whose associated capacity constraints are given in
Eqs. (3.9) to (3.15). The total rated transformer capacity determines the maximum
amount of power that can be imported/exported to/from the distribution system,
as in (3.9) and (3.10), respectively. As in (3.6), a substation capacity addition step
size W ss.st is used to set initial substation sizes and EOL. The maximum allowable
capacity is set in (3.11), while (3.12) sets the minimum size by which a substation
can be upgraded. Eqs. (3.12) to (3.14) set the binary constraints and (3.15) limits





(W ss.sti,t′ + w
ss
i,t′) ∀i ∈ N
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i ∀i ∈ N
ss (3.11)
wssi,t ≥ W
ss.minzssi,t ∀i ∈ N
ss, t ∈ T (3.12)
wssi,t ≤ Mz
ss
i,t ∀i ∈ N












Additional reliability may be achieved by placing (select) buses in a loop or network
configuration through (3.16) and (3.17). N loopx is the subset of buses to be connected















zfdr.b(i,j),t ≥ 2 ∀i ∈ N
loop
x , t ∈ T (3.17)
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Intertie Capacity Limits
It is assumed the distribution systems connected via interties share the same voltage
and thus transformers are not required; limits are set by the neighbouring LDC.





(W int.sti,t′ + w
int
i,t′ ) ∀i ∈ N




(W int.sti,t + w
int
i,t ) ≤ W
int.max
i ∀i ∈ N
int, t ∈ T (3.19)
winti,t ≤ Mz
int
i,t ∀i ∈ N
int, t ∈ T (3.20)
Utility-DG Capacity Limits
DG units may either be utility or SPP-owned (as permitted). The planner sets
technology, size, and placement for their LDC’s DG units, whose energy is limited
by its initial capacity, any upgrade, and expected capacity factor, in (3.21). Eqs.
(3.22), (3.23), and (3.24) limits max and min sizes.




















q,i,t ∀q ∈ Q, i ∈ N, t ∈ T (3.23)
wdgq,i,t ≤ Mz
dg
q,i,t ∀q ∈ Q, i ∈ N, t ∈ T (3.24)
SPP-DG Capacity Limits
The planner may have no control over the size, location, or time of SPP-DG in-
vestments. Nevertheless, generation from SPP-DG must be included in the SPPM
as given by (3.25) and (3.26). Under special circumstances the planner may be
able to set the location(s) at which an SPP may place their DG, or, alternatively,
it may want to find the preferred locations for SPP-DG (e.g., for subsidies to en-
courage investment). Equations (3.25) and (3.26) allow for the utility to exercise
these options. Otherwise, placement can be fixed at specific bus as per the SPP’s
decision.
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Eq. (3.26) is applied if the LDC has control over the dispatch of energy from
SPP-DG; otherwise, if the utility is mandated to purchase all the energy produced
by SPPs, (3.26) is an equality.
∑
i∈Nk
zdgi,k = 1 ∀k ∈ K (3.25)





∀k ∈ K, i ∈ Nk, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (3.26)
Utility and SPP-DG Capacity Limits
Minimum and/or maximum DG penetration, as determined by the regulator, is




































∀b ∈ B, t ∈ T (3.28)
Budget Limits
The annual capital expenditures on feeders, substations, interties, and utility-owned
DG, made by the LDC is limited by an allowable budget, Bgt (3.29).
a○+ b○+ c○+ d○ ≤ BgtLDCt ∀t ∈ T (3.29)
CO2 Emissions Tax and Capacity Limits
Two sources of air pollution that can be attributed to DG: CO2 and NOx; CO2
currently garners the most attention by policy makers and is therefore the focus of
(3.30). This constraint calculates all excess CO2 emissions above CO2
cap
t . Used in
conjunction with i○ of (3.1), it gives either a strict emissions tax or a ‘cap and tax’
scheme. It is assumed that the LDC picks up the additional costs associated with
pollution from SPP-DG, as economically, the additional costs are usually passed
along. Emissions associated with the import of energy via substations and interties
are not included because they are generated outside the jurisdiction of the LDC
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and thus are assumed not to be of immediate concern to it. It may also be assumed













≤ CO2capt + CO2
xs
t ∀t ∈ T (3.30)
Variable Limits


































3.4 CPPM: Mathematical Description
The CPPM takes as input the distribution system resource upgrades/installations,
their locations, and build dates obtained from the SPPM and determines the capac-
ity (within pre-defined bounds) with accurate power flow representation, including
losses and voltage drop constraints. Variables from the SPPM entering the CPPM
as parameters are denoted with the prefix ‘sp.’.
3.4.1 Objective Function
The objective function J2 of the CPPM (3.31) does not have the fixed costs that
appear in J1 of the SPPM; capital cost are given in lines k○ to m○ and energy and
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A non-linear approximation of the power flow and losses, same as in [49], is used
in (3.32). Feeder impedance absZ is set by the planner according to output from
the SPPM. If the feeder segment is unchanged then its impedance will be identical
to its initial value, otherwise its value will reflect any upgrades. Like (3.2), exports
















P dgq,i,b,t − P
dg
k,i,b,t
∀i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (3.32)
where
P fdr(i,j),b,t = Vi,b,t
(Vi,b,t − Vj,b,t)
absZ(i,j),t
∀i, j ∈ N : ∃ (i, j) (3.33)
Bus Voltage Limits
The voltage profile is maintained within specified limits. Since reactive power and
voltage support devices are not modelled, these limits may be larger than typical.
Vi,b,t ≤ V
max ∀i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (3.34)
Vi,b,t ≥ V
min ∀i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (3.35)
3.4.3 Power Adequacy Limits
The equation for power adequacy limits in the CPPM is similar to that in the
SPPM (3.8).
Feeder Capacity Limits
The equation for feeder capacity limits in the CPPM (3.36) is identical to (3.6).











∀i, j ∈ N : ∃ (i, j), b ∈ B, t ∈ T (3.36)
wfdr(i,j),t ≥ (Lo)sp.w
fdr
(i,j),t ∀i, j ∈ N : ∃ (i, j), t ∈ T (3.37)
wfdr(i,j),t ≤ (Hi)sp.w
fdr
(i,j),t ∀i, j ∈ N : ∃ (i, j), t ∈ T (3.38)
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Substation Capacity Limits
Constraints limiting substation capacity in the CPPM are identical to (3.9)-(3.11).




i,t ∀i ∈ N
ss, t ∈ T (3.39)
wssi,t ≤ (Hi)sp.w
ss
i,t ∀i ∈ N
ss, t ∈ T (3.40)
Intertie Capacity Limits
The intertie capacity limits constraints in the CPPM are the same as (3.18) and




i,t ∀i ∈ N
int, t ∈ T (3.41)
winti,t ≤ (Hi)sp.w
int
i,t ∀i ∈ N
int, t ∈ T (3.42)
Utility-DG Capacity Limits
Equations setting utility-DG capacity limits in the CPPM are identical to (3.21)




q,i,t ∀q ∈ Q, i ∈ N, t ∈ T (3.43)
wdgq,i,t ≤ (Hi)sp.w
dg
q,i,t ∀q ∈ Q, i ∈ N, t ∈ T (3.44)
SPP-DG Capacity Limits
Equations (3.45) to (3.47) are applied if the LDC has control over the amount of
energy it may purchase/contract from SPP-DG. Else, if the LDC is mandated to
purchase/contract all SPP-DG energy, then (3.48) applies.
P dgk,i,b ≥ (Lo)sp.P
dg
k,i,b,t ∀k ∈ K, i ∈ Nk, b ∈ B (3.45)
P dgk,i,b ≤ (Hi)sp.P
dg
k,i,b,t ∀k ∈ K, i ∈ Nk, b ∈ B (3.46)
P dgk,i,bHrsb ≤ ECFk,bW
dg
k Hrsb ∀k ∈ K, i ∈ Nk, b ∈ B (3.47)
P dgk,i,b = sp.P
dg
k,i,b,t ∀k ∈ K, i ∈ Nk, b ∈ B (3.48)
Utility and SPP-DG Capacity Limits
Constraints on DG penetration limits in the CPPM are the same as in (3.27) and
(3.28).
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CO2 Emissions Tax and Capacity Limits
The CO2 Emissions Tax and Capacity limits in the CPPM are identical to those of
the SPPM (3.30).
Variable Limits
















i,t , and w
ss
i,t
are positive; P fdr(i,j),b,t is unrestricted in sign.
3.4.4 Network Check
In networked distribution systems, the power flow approximations used in the
SPPM yield feeder capacity addition recommendations that may make the CPPM
problem infeasible. In order to assess the need for the above fix, equations (3.31)



























∀i, j ∈ N : ∃ (i, j), b ∈ B, t ∈ T (3.50)
Fig. 3.2 illustrates the network check and fix.
3.4.5 Reactive Power Planning
The SPPM and CPPM assume that the distribution system operates at unity power
factor and thus reactive power does not contribute significantly to the current flow
along feeders. In distribution systems with reactive power support and energy from
sources at unity power factor (such as substations, interties, and synchronous DG)
this assumption is accurate. However, some DG technologies, such as wind turbines
with induction generators, can draw significant reactive power (if they do not have
their own source) and thus additional feeder capacity may be required above that
anticipated in the model.
In such an instance where DG may have large reactive power requirements, and
thus the assumption of unity power factor is not valid, the framework will need to
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Figure 3.2: SPPM and CPPM Network Check
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Table 3.1: Investment Costs of Utility Resources [50], [9], [10]
Element
EPC Cost Capital Cost
Symbol Cost (Year-0) Symbol Cost (Year-0)
Feeder Ccfdr.ft $150,000/km Cc
fdr.v
t $1,000/MW
Substation Ccss.ft $200,000 Cc
ss.v
t $50,000/MW
Intertie Ccint.ft $200,000 Cc
int.v
t $1,000/MW
Diesel Engine DG - - Ccdg.fk,t $400,000/MW
Gas Turbine DG - - Ccdg.fk,t $825,000/MW
Solar-PV DG - - Ccdg.fk,t $7,500,000/MW
Wind Turbine DG - - Ccdg.fk,t $2,500,000/MW
due to the complexities of a MINLP model. Adjusting the model appropriately is
an area of future research, and may involve reworking the CPPM to accommodate
full load and power flow modelling, or approximating MVA flows by estimating
power factors.
3.5 Description of Radial Distribution Test
System
To demonstrate the suitability of the proposed distribution system planning frame-
work, a 32-bus radial distribution system [86] is considered for the studies (Fig.
3.3). The system demand has been scaled to suit the problem case requirements
and supplemented with the additional technical details of feeder, intertie, and sub-
station limits, and DG options.
The system is comprised of 32 buses split among 4 branches with a grid-
connected substation at bus-1 and a candidate intertie site at bus-30. The total
system peak demand is 37 MW (including reserve) in year-0 and grows 3% annu-
ally. Each feeder segment is 1 km long, has Ge=0.4, and a loss factor of 2% (which
results in a total loss of approximately 7% in the SPPM). Shown in the diagram,
beside each feeder segment, are the peak feeder flows (in MVA) and feeder limits at
year-0. Feeder segment (18, 19) has an expected EOL at year-3. It is also stated in
advance that the LDC will have to accommodate three SPP-DG investments whose
details are in Table 3.3.
Table 3.1 provides the investment costs of the resources available to the LDC.
Utility-owned DG resources only have per unit capital costs and their EPC cost
is assumed to be insignificantly small in comparison. These DGs must have a
minimum capacity of 3 MW.


























































Figure 3.3: 32-Bus Radial Distribution System. The circled numbers denote bus
numbers while the number a/b beside each feeder segment gives the initial power
flow/feeder capacity, in MVA.
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Market, Cessb,t $75/MWh $92/MWh $110/MWh
Neighbouring LDC, Ceintb,t $50/MWh $70/MWh $100/MWh
For Export, Cexb,t $73/MWh $90/MWh $108/MWh
Diesel Engine DG, Codgq,t $90/MWh → $90/MWh
Gas Turbine DG, Codgq,t $75/MWh → $75/MWh
Solar-PV DG, Codgq,t $4/MWh → $4/MWh
Wind Turbine DG, Codgq,t $10/MWh → $10/MWh
Table 3.3: SPP-DG Commissioning Plan (known a priori)
DG Technology
Solar-PV Natural Gas Wind Turbine
Number (ID), k SPP-DG 1 SPP-DG 2 SPP-DG 3
Commissioning , t Year-2 Year-2 Year-4
Possible Site(s), NSPPk
Bus-17, 29, 30
Bus-23 Bus-19 or 20
31, or 32
Size, W dgk 1.5 MW 1.0 MW 2.0 MW
import prices through substations and interties, and export prices, are specified in
terms of the three time-blocks of peak, intermediate, and base. Production costs
from utility-owned DG units are independent of demand level, and reflect operating,
fuel, and maintenance costs. Table 3.4 gives the purchase price of energy from SPP-
DG and Table 3.5 gives the expected capacity factor, averaged over all load blocks,
and CO2 emission coefficients from utility and SPP-DG units.
Annual discount rates (for energy and capital) and the rate of change in capital
and operating costs of utility-owned DG are given in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, respectively.
Capital costs for some utility-owned DG are assumed to decrease as technology
improves, whereas diesel and gas prices (and thus operating costs) are expected to
increase over time. Other miscellaneous parameters are given in Table 3.8.
3.5.1 End Effects
One important issue in planning models to be considered is end effects, which may
occur when the ‘finite planning horizon’ influences the optimal choice of invest-
ments. Without mitigation of this effect large capital expenses will be avoided in
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Table 3.5: ECF and CO2 Emission Coefficients for Utility and SPP-DG
Technology, q ECF, ECFq,i,b CO2 Emissions, CO2
dg
q
Diesel Engine 98% 0.65 MT/MWh
Gas Turbine 98% 0.63 MT/MWh
Solar-PV 16.5% -
Wind Turbine 30% -
Table 3.6: Finance Rates
Energy Cost and CO2 Tax Discount Rate, R
LDC.e 8.0%
Capital Cost Discount Rate, RLDC.c 8.0%
Table 3.7: Change in DG Unit Costs over Plan Horizon
Utility-DG
Annual Change in Annual Change in
Capital Cost Operating Cost
Diesel Engine - 3.0%
Gas Turbine - 4.0%
Solar-PV -4.0% -
Wind Turbine -1.0% -
Table 3.8: Miscellaneous Parameters
Description Value
Emissions Tax, CtCO2t $10/tonne
Emissions Cap, CO2capt 30,000 tonnes/year
Hours in Year, Hrsb Base: 4380; Intm: 3504; Peak: 876
Demand (% of Peak) Base: 50; Intm: 85; Peak: 100
Max DG Penetration, DGmax 20%
Voltage Limits, V max/V min 1.05 p.u. Max; 0.95 p.u. Min
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Table 3.9: Lifespan of Capital [88]
Element Lifespan
Substations 30 years
Feeders and Interties 35 years
Diesel Engine 25 years
Gas Turbine DG 25 years
Solar-PV DG 30 years
Wind-Turbine DG 20 years
Table 3.10: Model Statistics - BASE Case
SPPM CPPM
Solver CPLEX MINOS
Blocks of Equations 34 29
Blocks of Variables 20 13
Single Equations 52,747 21,413
Single Variables 45,198 13,111
Non-Zero Elements 282,026 119,416
Discrete Variables 23,737 N/A
Generation Time (s) 0.859 0.226
Resource Usage (s) 107 43.7
Relative Gap (%) 0.0996 N/A
later years due to the long recovery periods of their costs . To mitigate these effects
the framework can be modified to subtract the salvage values of capital invest-
ments at the end of the planning horizon. In this work, straight-line depreciation
is used [87] to determine salvage values. The expected lifespans of units are given
in Table 3.9.
3.5.2 Computational Details
The considered test system was programmed and executed in the GAMS environ-
ment [89] on an IBM eServer xSeries 460 with 8 Intel Xeon 2.8 Ghz processors and
3 GB (effective) of RAM. The first stage model, the SPPM, is a MILP model which
is solved using CPLEX while the CPPM, which is a NLP model, is solved using
MINOS. The model and solver statistics are given in Table 3.10.
The distribution planning problem should ideally be formulated as a single
MINLP model. However, with current optimization algorithms such problems are
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computationally very difficult, even for small sized systems. This approach breaks
the problem into MIP and NLP problems. Since a globally optimal solution is near
impossible to prove, it is desirable to simply achieve a near-optimal solution.
The SPPM, a MIP solved using CPLEX, was considered acceptable when a
relative gap, the difference between the solution and minimum bound, of less than
0.1% was achieved. This gap can be set by the user, but this is considered to be
well within any margin of error. As a NLP problem, the CPPM’s solution needs
a good starting point to give the best possible locally optimal solution. Since this
point is generated by the SPPM, it can be considered the best possible given that
the SPPM gives a reasonable approximation of the problem.
3.6 Tests, Results, and Discussions
Two different approaches of examining the performance and effectiveness of the pro-
posed distribution system planning framework are employed. The first approach
applies the framework as a distribution system planner, so as to make recommenda-
tions on a 10 year investment plan and production/contract schedule. The second
approach applies the framework as a policy maker, and hence analyzes the impact
of multiple policy sets on investments, production/contract schedules, emissions,
costs, and system voltage profile.
3.6.1 BASE Case Plan Recommendations
The BASE case represents an energy resource unconstrained distribution planning
problem. The LDC is permitted to invest in and operate DG units at its discretion,
but is required to purchase all energy produced by SPP-DGs at pre-determined
prices. A budgetary limit on annual capital expenditures by the LDC of $10M is
imposed. The LDC is allowed to invest in an intertie connection with the neigh-
bouring LDC and can export surplus energy via its substation. A ‘cap and tax’
CO2 tax scheme is also included in this case.
Fig. 3.4 depicts the radial distribution system with recommended resource
investments accumulated to year-10. Feeder segments that are to be upgraded are
denoted by the dotted lines. The feeder power flows shown in Fig. 3.4 are for
peak demand periods; the corresponding feeder limits are also shown alongside.
The corresponding distribution system investment plan is given in Table 3.11. It
is observed that the 10 year plan emphasizes gas turbine DG investments in the
first year, which is justifiable given their low capital outlay and low initial operating
cost. In later years, investment in gas turbines is not justifiable because of increased
operating costs from gas price increases and hence investments in wind turbines
are recommended. Note that the plan recommends DG investments be placed near
the end of feeder branches where they have the most impact on reducing feeder
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Table 3.11: Utility Investment Plan
Year
Investment Size (MW) and Site (Bus)
SS, wssi,t Int, w
int
i,t Gas Turbine, w
dg





1 - 10 (30) 3.5 (7), 3.0 (12) - 1.8 (29,30)
- - 3.0 (15), 4.1 (24) - -
3 - - - - 3.6 (18,19)
7 - - - 3.0 (16) -
9 - - - 3.2 (13) -
losses. One investment in an intertie connection is recommended at the start of the
planning period, as this is a cheap source of energy, while no substation upgrades
are recommended by the distribution system plan. Among the feeder investments
link (18, 19) is a replacement for the existing feeder which is expected to reach its
EOL. Buses 17 and 23 were selected for SPP-DG units 1 and 3, respectively, and
were placed to maximize loss reduction; the LDC had no influence on the placement
of SPP-DG 2.
Table 3.12 presents the LDC’s energy production/contract schedules (only even-
numbered years are reported for lack of space). The schedules are consistent with
the resource assets available to it; the reduction in gas turbine production in later
years is due to increased costs of fuel. The intertie is used to its maximum capacity
while the substation always has excess capacity available (in part to serve the
system’s energy adequacy requirement). The export of energy via the substation,
which starts in year-1, is a result of the excess generation capacity available from
LDC and SPP-DG, which can be sold for additional income.
It is observed that the proposed distribution system planning framework pro-
vides a comprehensive set of decisions on new investments, generation, and ex-
port/import schedules, keeping in mind the multiple constraints and objectives of
the LDC. The application of the proposed framework can be expanded to exam-
ine several critical issues pertaining to policies with regard to distribution system
planning in a deregulated environment, as discussed next.
Sensitivity Analysis
In deregulated markets, there can be uncertainty in the price of energy. Conse-
quently, it is important to look at the sensitivity of the results to changes in energy
prices. To accomplish this, the price of energy to/from the market (Cessbt , Ce
s
bt),
the neighbouring LDC (Ceintbt ), and contract price for energy from SPP-DG (Ce
dg
k,b,t)












































































Figure 3.4: Radial Distribution System: Year-10 Peak Flows. Dashed lines indicate
upgraded feeder segments.
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Table 3.12: LDC Production/Contract Schedules
Supply Element Bus
Demand Year/Supply (MW)
Level 2 4 6 8 10
Substation (Import) 1 Base 8.8 9.2 10.5 10.6 10.8
Intm 16.9 18.5 20.8 28.1 29.9
Peak 21.6 23.6 25.7 27.9 30.2
Intertie (Import) 30 All 10.0 → → → 10.0
Gas Turbine 7 Intm 3.48 3.48 - - -
Peak 3.48 → → → 3.48
12 Intm 2.96 2.96 2.64 - -
Peak 2.96 → → → 2.96
15 Intm 2.94 2.94 2.57 - -
Peak 2.94 → → → 2.94
24 Intm 4.02 4.02 0.18 - -
Peak 4.20 → → → 4.02
Wind Turbine 14 Base - - - - 1.26
Intm - - - - 0.73
Peak - - - - 0.25
17 Base - - - 1.20 1.20
Intm - - - 0.69 0.69
Peak - - - 0.24 0.24
SPP-DG 1 17 Base 0.11 → → → 0.11
Intm 0.38 → → → 0.38
Peak 0.45 → → → 0.45
SPP-DG 2 23 All 0.98 → → → 0.98
SPP-DG 3 20 Base - 0.80 → → 0.80
Intm - 0.46 → → 0.46
Peak - 0.16 → → 0.16
Substation (Export) 1 Intm 8.0 8.1 - - -




































Figure 3.5: Comparison of NPCs Varying Energy Prices
Table 3.13: Comparison of Capital Investments Varying Energy Prices
Investment Size (MW) and # of Builds
Intertie Gas Turbine Wind T Feeder
-20% 10.0 (1) 6.0 (2) - 5.5 (4)
-10% 10.0 (1) 6.0 (2) - 5.5 (3)
0 10.0 (1) 13.7 (4) 6.2 (2) 5.4 (2)
+10% 10.0 (1) 23.3 (7) 9.6 (3) 4.5 (2)
+20% 10.0 (1) 52.4 (10) 19.2 (5) 2.9 (2)
The energy, capital, and total costs to the LDC over the 10-year plan period,
for the energy price scenarios analyzed, are given in Fig. 3.5. Table 3.13 gives the
accumulated capital investments by LDC up to the planning horizon. It is seen
that from -20% to +10%, there is a steady increase in energy costs. However, from
0 to +10%, the increased energy costs are mitigated by increased investments in
utility DG (both gas and wind). At +20%, energy costs actually decrease due to
large wind DG investments.
The LDC’s NPC increases commensurate to increasing energy and capital costs.
However, between the +10% to +20% mark, it is noted that the NPC begins to
level off. At this price point, the increasing costs occur due to capital expenditures
in wind and gas DG units; the low operational costs of wind and gas DG (compared
to market energy costs), and subsequent export from these sources, mitigate the
high cost of purchasing energy from the market.
























Change in Energy Prices
Figure 3.6: Comparison of CO2 Emissions Varying Energy Prices
prices due to the gas turbines used to replace the more expensive energy imported
from the grid. Conversely, losses, in Fig. 3.7, decrease due to increased DG pene-
tration. Predictably, higher prices also correlated to better voltage profiles, in Fig.
3.8, again due to higher penetration of DG.
In essence, higher costs of energy will lead to the increased investment in DG (all
else being equal). It is also noted that the increased costs well lead to a technically
improved system (in terms of losses and voltage profile) but also much higher CO2
emissions. From a regulatory standpoint, this may lead to the dilemma of having
to increase carbon taxes to mitigate carbon emissions, thus forcing consumers to
bear the full brunt of higher energy prices.
3.6.2 Policy Analysis in the Context of Distribution System
Planning
In this section, the proposed distribution system planning framework is used to
examine the potential impacts of policies and regulations that may be imposed by
regulators and governments on discos to achieve certain technical, environmental,
social, and/or economic goals. While policy makers may consider several combina-
tions of policies and regulations, the final mix of deployed policies comprise both
the constraints themselves and the parameters within. Some policies may be regu-
latory while others are due of technical limitations. Four cases are constructed, as
summarized in Table 3.14, and represent a broad spectrum of realistic policy and
technical directives, while also providing exhaustive test cases for the distribution
system planning framework. The net present costs (NPCs), new capacity, produc-
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of Voltage Profiles Varying Energy Prices
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Table 3.14: Policy Case Studies
Supply and Policy Scenario
Constraint/Rule BASE REG OPT ON
Interties Allowed Yes No Yes Yes




Fixed Fixed Optimal Fixed
dispatch dispatch dispatch dispatch
DG Maximum
20% 20% 20% 20%
Penetration, DGmax
Export Allowed Yes No Yes Yes
CO2 Tax Scheme Cap & Tax No Cap & Tax Cap & Tax
Annual Capital
$10M $10M $10M $10M
Budget, BgtLDCt
below. Each case assumes that the distribution system planner acts near-optimally
within the imposed constraints (i.e. minimizes costs). These cases are discussed in
detail below:
• Base (BASE) Case: This has already been described in detail above.
• Regulated (REG) Case: This policy set imitates scenarios where the LDC
is strictly regulated wherein energy imports via interties or exports from the
LDC are not permitted. A CO2 cap and tax scheme is not imposed. All other
aspects remain the same as the BASE case.
• Optimum (OPT) Case: This is similar to the BASE case except that the
LDC is no longer required to purchase a ‘fixed’ quantity of energy from SPP-
DGs but is allowed to dispatch the quantity of energy at its discretion, but
at the same predetermined prices.
• Ontario (ON) Case: This case mimics the regulations (except for the im-
posed CO2 cap and tax) that are currently practiced in Ontario and which
the discos must adhere to. It is similar to the BASE case, with the exception
that discos are not permitted to invest in DG capacity.
Net Present Costs
The NPCs to the LDC from capital investments and energy production cum pur-
chase over the 10-year plan period is presented in Fig. 3.9, corresponding to the
BASE case and the three other cases discussed earlier. The capital cost components
within the NPC are obtained from the SPPM while the energy costs are obtained
from the CPPM. The salvage component of the capital cost is the discounted value




































Figure 3.9: Comparison of NPCs Across Policies
It is immediately observable that the NPC from the REG case is higher than
from the other three cases. This is attributable to the REG policy prohibiting
the use of intertie resources, one of the cheapest sources of energy, resulting in
higher energy costs and total costs. The BASE and OPT cases have identical
NPCs despite the difference in dispatch rules, which leads to the conclusion that,
for given system, all SPP-DG investments are a benefit to the system (as discussed
in Section 3.6.2). This is attributed to the lower price of energy from SPP-DGs
(compared to LDC purchased market/external grid energy) and DG unit placement
at the feeder extremities.
Capital Investments
A comparison across the policy cases for the accumulated capital investments made
by the LDC up to the planning horizon is presented in Table 3.15. It is observed
that, when permitted to do so (in the BASE, REG, and OPT cases), the LDC should
invest in DG units. The highest DG unit investments are made in the BASE and
OPT cases, where the ability to export energy offsets the unused capacity of the
LDC, thus justifying its increased capital outlay. Significantly less DG investments
are recommended in the REG case due to the prohibition on exports to the grid.
An intertie, a relatively inexpensive source of energy, is planned for in each
of the cases when allowed (BASE, OPT, and ON). In the BASE and ON case,
it allows the utility to reduce its imports via substations and also frees up DG
capacity for profitable export. In the REG and ON case studies, the additional
substation capacity is built to meet adequacy requirements, but not used in normal
operation. In the BASE and OPT cases, utility-DG (which is usually scheduled to
export to the grid), can also be used to meet adequacy requirements. Only two
57
Table 3.15: Comparison of Capital Investments Across Policies
Investment Size (MW) and # of Builds
Substation Intertie Gas Turbine Wind T Feeder
BASE - 10.0 (1) 13.7 (4) 6.2 (2) 5.4 (2)
REG 10.0 (1) - 6.6 (2) 6.2 (2) 3.7 (2)
OPT - 10.0 (1) 13.7 (4) 6.2 (2) 5.4 (2)
ON 10.0 (1) 10.0 (1) - - 6.1 (4)
feeder segment upgrades are required in the BASE, OPT, and REG cases since
feeder loading is reduced by DG units placed at feeder-ends. In the ON case, the
lack of utility-DG means demand must be served from the substation (further from
the load) and thus more feeder segments must be upgraded to handle increased
loading.
Energy Production/Transfer Schedule
Fig. 3.10 shows the LDC’s energy production, contracting, and import/export
schedule aggregated over the 10-year planning period. Imports from the external
grid, via substations, followed by imports via interties (where available) account for
the largest share of energy under all policy cases. The energy purchased by the LDC
from SPP-DG in the OPT case is identical to that in fixed dispatch scheme BASE,
proving that the SPP-DG investments contribute significantly to displacement of
expensive energy purchases from the grid. Exports to the grid occur in the BASE
and OPT cases when it is profitable to use the available capacity (not serving
demand) from DG units. In the ON case, no export is scheduled since there is
no utility-DG capacity, and all other energy sources are used to offset substation
purchases.
CO2 Emissions
Total CO2 emissions over 10 years (Fig. 3.11) are directly correlated to energy
produced by SPP and utility-DG. It should be noted that CO2 emissions from
imported energy via substations and interties are neglected. This is consistent
with LDC-centric planning not concerning a global emissions policy, which will be
explored in Chapter 4. Since utility-DG units are not permitted in the ON case,
the only contribution to emissions comes from SPP-DG. The higher CO2 emissions
in the other three cases originate from the low cost polluting gas turbines. Note
that total CO2 emissions for all policy cases are below the specified cap, therefore




















































































Figure 3.12: Comparison of Voltage Profiles Across Policies
Voltage Profile and Distribution Losses
The distribution system voltage profiles for each case, at year-10 during peak de-
mand (Fig. 3.12) are within acceptable ranges because of the voltage constraints
imposed in the CPPM. The cases with smaller DG investments, REG and ON, have
poorer voltage profiles than the ones with higher DG support, BASE and OPT,
whose units can provide voltage support at injection sites located at feeder ends.
Feeder losses in the radial distribution system (Fig. 3.13) are correlated with
each case’s voltage profile; cases with higher voltage profiles have lower losses. In
the REG case, utility-DG units are unable to fully offset the loss increase from not
being able to utilize the interties, available in the ON case. It can be concluded
that, in certain cases, interties can have a greater impact on losses than DG.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presents a comprehensive framework for distribution system planning
in a deregulated environment in the presence of DG units. A sequential two-stage
scheme comprising the SPPM and the CPPM are proposed. The planning frame-
work takes into consideration various complex issues such as those arising from
uncoordinated private investments in DG, and environmental emissions. The de-
tailed plan results have been successfully demonstrated from a utility planner’s and
policy maker’s perspective.
The proposed planning framework is generic in nature and may be used to ana-
lyze policies and their effects on LDC decisions and the resultant changes in distri-

















Figure 3.13: Comparison of Distribution Feeder Losses Across Policies
four typical policy scenarios in this chapter. It is found that capital investments in
DG are justified by their savings in energy costs over the 10 year planning period
and that, furthermore, the ability to export energy is important in determining the
placement of DG. Of the DG technologies examined (diesel engines, gas turbines,
wind turbines, solar-PV), gas turbines are favoured for their lower costs and wind
turbines become viable once the price of gas increases beyond a certain level.
Whereas this chapter largely examines the effects of allowing DG investments,
from the LDC’s point of view, the next chapter examines the effects, from the
regulator’s standpoint, of the different incentives and policies that can be used to




Feed-in-Tariffs and Carbon Taxes
on Distribution Systems1
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, a mathematical framework for the planning of distribution systems
considering DG is presented. An analysis of the various policies related to deregu-
lation, i.e. the permission of LDCs and SPPs to invest in DG, is briefly examined
from the LDC’s point of view. In this chapter, the focus shifts to government reg-
ulators, since controlling the penetration of DG investments is not the domain of
the LDC but rather the government. This work examines the wide range of policy
instruments at the disposal of the regulators, such as FITs, that can be used to
meet regulatory and environmental goals with DG investments.
4.1.1 Standard Offer Program
The Integrated Power System Plan (IPSP) for Ontario [90], developed by the On-
tario Power Authority (OPA) every three years, chalks out a direction of growth
for the Ontario power system. The current IPSP, covering the next 20 years, em-
phasizes the development of clean and renewable energy sources and the phasing
out of several major polluting coal-fired power plants. To achieve the former, the
Standard Offer Program (SOP) [91], [92], developed by the Ontario Energy Board
1The work presented in this chapter has been submitted for publication, and is in revision, in
S. Wong, K. Bhattacharya, and J.D. Fuller, “Long-Term Effects of Feed-in Tariffs and Carbon
Taxes on Distribution Systems,” IEEE Trans. on Power Syst., In Revision. An earlier version of
this work has been presented and appears in S. Wong, K. Bhattacharya and J.D. Fuller, “Environ-
mental and economic analysis of Ontarios Standard Offer Program for small power producers,”
Proc. IEEE PES Annual General Meeting, Pittsburgh, USA, 2008.
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(OEB) and OPA, was introduced for SPPs investing in DG units, who previously
could only sell energy through net-metering.
The SOP is classified into two parts: the Clean Energy SOP (CESOP) and
the Renewable Energy SOP (RESOP). CESOP [91] projects must be natural-gas
CHP, by-product fuel fired, or under-utilized thermal or mechanical. RESOP [92]
projects must be bio-gas, solar PV, wind, or hydro units. DG-unit investment
proposals must be less than a gross capacity of 10 MW at the point of connection.
Ontario’s SOP offers the SPPs set prices, fractionally indexed to inflation, for
energy produced from qualified DG units over the life of the contract (20 years).
Under the old (pre-2008) CESOP, SPPs receive the Hourly Ontario Energy Price
(HOEP) plus an 8¢/kWh premium during peak periods and a 4¢/kWh premium
during intermediate and base periods. Under the new CESOP, introduced in 2008,
SPPs with CHP projects receive a contingent support payment, which is the dif-
ference between their actual net market revenue and the net revenue guarantee, as
determined by the OPA [91].
SPP-DG units participating in the RESOP are paid as per their technology
in place: solar-PV units receive a price of 42¢/kWh while wind-turbines receive
11.04¢/kWh plus a 3¢/kWh premium for reliable peak period generation.2 Re-
sponsibility for payments to SPPs under the RESOP lies with the OPA and the
connecting LDC: the LDC pays for energy up to the HOEP and the OPA pays the
remaining amount [93]. For example, if a solar-PV based SPP produces 1 kWh of
energy when the HOEP is 8¢/kWh, the LDC will pay 8¢/kWh and the OPA will
pay 34¢/kWh to the SPP.
The incentives offered in the RESOP have arguably been a large success. The
resultant effect of these FITs, in Ontario, has been a large volume of investment
proposals from SPPs. As of February 2009, the Ontario Power Authority has
secured 428 contracts with a total of 1.4 GW generating capacity: 745 MW from
wind, 525 MW from solar-photovoltaic, 66 MW from hydro, and 73 MW from bio-
energy sources [94]. Each of these DG investments have unit sizes of 10 MW or
less.
4.1.2 Carbon Taxes and Cap-and-Trade Mechanisms
Governments attempting to reduce carbon emissions may employ penalties through
carbon taxes or cap-and-trade mechanisms. With a carbon tax mechanism, a tax
is imposed on a dollar per tonne of emission basis, for carbon emissions accrued by
the emitter or the end user. Carbon tax mechanisms are imposed in some European
countries, including Sweden (CDN$127/t [95]) and Finland. Taxes have been pro-
posed in Canada, but as of yet have only been implemented at the provincial level,
in Quebec and British Columbia (CDN$15/t (in 2009) to $30/t (in 2012) [96]).
2As of 2008, the RESOP is currently under revision. The proposed changes will address the
competitive procurement of capacity.
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Under a strict cap-and-trade mechanism, total CO2 emissions are capped; par-
ticipating entities are each allocated a set amount of allowable emissions which
sum to the cap. Entities must purchase additional carbon credits, usually via an
emissions credit market, to exceed their quota. They may also sell unused portions
of their quota as emission credits. Under an intensity-based cap-and-trade mecha-
nism, CO2 emissions are capped per unit of output. For example, an SPP’s CO2
quota would be based on its energy output. They may or may not be able to sell
the unused portions.
4.1.3 The Role of DG in Distribution System Planning
The penetration of DG, utility-owned or SPP-owned, into the power system has
been fostered by technological progress and widespread regulatory acceptance and
programs (as stated above). Furthermore, the deregulation of the power system
industry has opened it up to increased supply from SPP-DG.
The impact of DG on the distribution may vary depending on ownership and
regulations in place. Within Ontario, SPP-DG placement is uncoordinated (with
the LDC) and up to the SPPs, so long as it is technically feasible for the LDC
to integrate it. Operationally, SPP-owned DG units are not dispatchable and,
as long as variable costs are recovered, they should produce at their maximum
capacity. On the other hand, LDC-owned DG units can be optimally sited and
sized into the distribution system, maximizing economic benefits to the LDC and
its customers. Operationally, they can be dispatched (provided the technology
permits) to maximize their impact and minimize costs to the system.
The push from governments and consumers to find environmentally sustainable
sources of energy is further driving the penetration of DG units that are seen
as clean or renewable. Clean or renewable energy DG investments may result in
carbon reductions by substituting for ‘dirty’ energy, e.g. using wind or solar fueled
generation to replace energy from coal-fueled bulk energy generators, as discussed
in Ontario’s Integrated Power System Plan [90]. Such DG investments are often
the subject of additional incentives, like FITs, encouraging investment. However,
the explicit impact of FITs and carbon tax or cap-and-trade schemes on DG units
and planning of their host distribution system has not been formally resolved in
literature.
Questions may arise as to what is the most appropriate FIT to achieve envi-
ronmental and economic goals within the power system. For example, how large
should the FITs be for them to be effective in attracting investments in chosen
technologies to meet the long-term growth requirements of the energy sector? On a
larger policy scale, it may be asked what are the implications of policies permitting
LDCs to invest in DG capacity within their own distribution system network. Since
the stated goals of FITs, CO2 tax, or cap-and-trade mechanisms are to reduce CO2
emissions, it must be examined how effective they are in achieving this goal. The
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cost of these instruments to the energy consumer is also a relevant question. In
essence, the design and suitability of these instruments to reduce emissions must
be examined.
This chapter attempts to address the above questions and issues, by
a) presenting a distribution system model that is appropriate for determining
the impact of regulatory policies on DG unit investments by SPPs as well
as LDCs
b) examining the impact of such investments on energy dispatch/purchase de-
cisions
c) examining the environmental and economic effects of various regulatory poli-
cies
The discussions on the impacts and effects of a FIT in combination with a
CO2 tax or cap-and-trade mechanism are based on scenarios outcomes, over a 10
year period, using the distribution system model. The FIT policies modelled in
this chapter are based in-part on those developed for Ontario by the OPA which
is responsible for setting policies and securing the long-term energy needs for the
province. [97]. The cap-and-trade mechanism employed is intensity based (t/MWh)
to avoid necessary complications and questions that would arise from dividing the
CO2 quotas between participants (as would be required with a strict cap-and-trade
mechanism.)
In Section 4.2 of this chapter, the mathematical formulation of the energy dis-
patch and DG investment model is presented. Section 4.3 examines and discusses
the effects of various regulatory policies through the application of the model to a
realistic 32-bus radial system and Section 4.4 presents the results and their analysis.
Conclusions and scope for future work are presented in Section 4.5.
4.2 Mathematical Description
The mathematical model presented below determines future DG unit investments
by SPPs and energy dispatch/purchase decisions by the LDC. It is assumed that
SPPs are autonomous from LDCs, but their investments in DG and their conse-
quent power injections to the LDC’s system must not undermine the nodal balance
constraints. This model gives a solution that is the most profitable to SPPs as a
whole, a likely outcome since it can be argued that SPPs with the most to profit
are likely to be the first to submit and have approved their proposals by the LDC
(and locking in their production schedules).




The objective function (J1), in (4.1), maximizes the SPPs’ profits from the sale of































































(t + Lsdgq − H − 1)
1
(1 + RSPPk )
(H−t+1)
∀ t + LsSPPq ≥ H (4.2)
else
αdgk,q,t = 0 (4.3)
Line a○ in (4.1), represents the SPPs’ income from energy sold to the LDC
including additional incentives from SOP, if applicable, net of operation and main-
tenance costs (discounted from the end of period t). Line b○ is the EPC costs
(discounted from the beginning of period t) for DG unit investments. Salvage val-
ues, at the end of the study period, are subtracted from infrastructure costs to
account for a finite study horizon. Lastly, line c○ represents the cost of emissions
incurred by the SPP in the form of carbon taxes. When the emissions are less than
the intensity cap, the cost is reversed and becomes an emissions credit to the SPP.
Note that a CO2 tax-only mechanism can also be put in place through line c○ by
having a capacity credit of zero.
Line d○ is an imaginary cost, for the export of energy from the distribution
system, used to control substation export levels. Exports are not controlled by the
SPPs, but the absence of the export variable, Px, in the objective function, J1,
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would cause illogical and distorted substation import and export levels; they would
be uncontrolled, checked only by each other in Eq. (4.4). It should be emphasized
that this cost is not incurred by SPPs nor does it have any effect on their energy
dispatch or purchase decisions.
4.2.2 Nodal Power Balance
Linear network power flows (4.4) are used to represent the supply and demand
balance in the distribution system. Feeder losses are approximated by a loss factor,
Llfdr(i,j), and accounted for in the incoming power flow incident on a bus. Equations
(4.5) and (4.6) ensure a unique direction to the feeder power flow. Note that, for

















P dgk,q,i,b,t ∀i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (4.4)
P fdr(i,j),b,t ≤ Mz
pf
(i,j),b,t ∀i, j ∈ N : ∃ (i, j) (4.5)
P fdr(j,i),b,t ≤ M(1 − z
pf
(i,j),b,t) ∀i, j ∈ N : ∃ (i, j) (4.6)
4.2.3 Export and Penetration Limits
System constraints limit (4.7) the quantity of energy that can be absorbed from
DG units to a percentage, DGmax, of demand plus exports. Substation transformer
limits (4.8) restrict the amount of energy that can be exported to the external
grid/market. Together, these limits mimic system technical constraints not mod-
elled here (such as feeder limits) and addresses system reliability concerns (since
DG may not be seen as a reliable energy source).
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k,q,i









∀b ∈ B, t ∈ T (4.7)
P xi,b,t ≤ P
x.max
i ∀i ∈ Nss, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (4.8)
4.2.4 DG Build
A SPP’s DG unit, classified by technology and bus, must be less than a specified
capacity (4.9) in order to qualify for the SOP. For the purpose of computations, a
67
DG unit is counted as one regardless of the number of capacity upgrades it may
undergo. From the SPP’s financial perspective, DG units must be of a minimum
size (4.10) to be practical. Equation (4.11) uses a binary variable to keep track












k,q ∀k ∈ K, q ∈ Q, i ∈ N, t ∈ T (4.10)
wdgk,q,i,t ≤ Mz
dg
k,q,i,t ∀k ∈ K, q ∈ Q, i ∈ N, t ∈ T (4.11)
4.2.5 DG Energy Limits
The availability factor and capacity factor of a DG unit constrains its total energy
output over a specified time period. Given that typical availability factors of DG
units are extremely high (disregarding fuel unavailability, a factor included in the
capacity factor), it can be assumed without loss of generality that the availability
factor is unity. Capacity factor, on the other hand, is primarily affected by dispatch
and/or fuel availability.
Since wind speed and solar radiation levels vary considerably over the course
of a day, the power generated from wind and solar-PV based DG units vary from
minute to minute. In order to incorporate the energy generated from such wind and
solar-PV units as a variable in long-term models, an average capacity factor is used.
Generation from DG units may also vary by location. Annual locational capacity
factors, segregated by peak, intermediate and base load levels, can be estimated
based on operator experience. These ECFs are used to specify the generation levels
from wind and solar-PV DG units in (4.12).





∀k ∈ K, q ∈ Qnd, i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (4.12)
For dispatchable DG units, the capacity factor is used as an upper limit on
energy generation during a certain load block (4.13). Unless constrained by system
limits, energy generated by SPP-DG units, either dispatchable or non-dispatchable,
is always accepted by the LDC. This is akin to the existing policy in Ontario.





∀k ∈ K, q ∈ Qd, i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (4.13)
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4.2.6 Variable Signs














4.2.7 Special Cases Permitting LDC Owned and Operated
DG
The objective function, J1 of (4.1), assumes that only SPPs may build and oper-
ate/dispatch DG units (as in Ontario). However, in some systems this may not
hold and SPP participation may not be permitted. In such a situation the LDC
may build and operate its own DG units, and will do so in a manner to minimize its
overall costs. To simulate this case, the objective function, J2, is now formulated
as the minimization of the LDC’s total costs (4.14). The constraints (4.4) to (4.13)
are still present, except that all references to SPPs are to be replaced by LDC.3
Note that SOP incentives are not available to the LDC, since it is assumed that
the LDC can achieve additional benefits from tighter integration that would make

































































3This model neglects the LDC’s substation and/or feeder costs, which are regarded as pre-
existing and thus sunk costs.
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(t + Lsdgq − H − 1)
1
(1 + Rd)(H−t+1)
∀ t + Lsdgq ≥ H (4.15)
else
αdgq,t = 0 (4.16)
Line a○ in (4.14), represents the operation and maintenance costs for DG units.
Line b○ represents the capital and EPC costs for DG unit investments. Line c○
represents the cost to the LDC for purchasing and importing energy from the mar-
ket/external grid, via substations, net of income it receives from selling energy to
the market/external grid, via substations. Lines d○ and e○ represent the cost of
emissions incurred by the LDC in the form of carbon taxes.4 Similar to c○ of
(4.1), these terms may become emission credits if emission levels are lower than the
emission cap.
4.3 Case Studies
To examine the effects of FITs (i.e., the SOP of Ontario) and carbon taxes on DG
investments in distribution systems, the two mathematical models of Section 4.2
are applied to a 32-bus radial distribution system. A 10-year planning period is
used for all the studies.
4.3.1 32-Bus Radial Distribution System
The test distribution system, Figure 4.1, consists of 32 buses in radial configuration.
Its electrical characteristics, including topology and active power demands, are
reproduced from [86]. The distribution system’s parameters are given in Table
4.1. The line loss, Ll, of 1.2% per segment corresponds to a system-wide gross
distribution loss of 8%.
4.3.2 LDC and SPP Parameters
The LDC’s parameters are given in Table 4.2. The value of CO2ss is the average
CO2 emissions from Ontario’s bulk electric system per unit of energy generated [98].
4In reality, CO2 emissions taxes would apply not to the LDC but to the bulk generators
supplying the LDC. However, estimating the effect that CO2 taxes would have on Ce
ss
b,t would be
difficult, and require a model far beyond what is done here. Instead, a rough approximation of

























































Figure 4.1: 32-Bus Radial Distribution System: Year-0 Loads and Power Flows
(Italicized)
Table 4.1: 32-Bus Distribution System Parameters
Horizon, H 10 years
Hours in year, Hrsb Base: 4380; Intm: 3504; Peak: 876
Est. feeder loss, Ll 1.2% per segment
Yr-0 demand, Pd (MW) Base: 18.58; Intm: 31.58; Peak: 37.15
Growth in Pd 3% per year, uniform across all loads
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Table 4.2: LDC Parameters
Market price of energy, Cessb Base: 55¢/kWh
Intm: 72¢/kWh
Peak: 90¢/kWh
CO2 from bulk generation, CO2
ss 0.2599t/MWh
Max. DG penetration, DGmax 20%
SS export capacity, P x.max 10 MW
LDC’s discount rate, RLDC 8%
In Table 4.3, various technology options for SPP investments in DG and their
associated cost, emission, and other related parameters are given [9], [10], [11].
ECFs were selected arbitrarily but within commonly accepted ranges for a typical
location within Ontario. It should be noted that the ECFs reported for wind and
solar-PV DG in Table 4.3 are maximum values. Since the ECFs of both wind and
solar-PV DG are locational-based, the actual ECF used in the study may be lower
at a bus. The market and RESOP rates are those currently in effect within Ontario.
CESOP rates are based on pre-2008 data.
4.3.3 Cases
Three base cases (1, 2, and 3) are constructed in order to examine various pol-
icy issues pertaining to the long-term impact of FITs and carbon taxes on DG
investments in distribution systems. These are summarized below.
• Case-1 represents a SPP-inclusive environment in which SPPs can invest in
DG units and sell energy to the LDC at the market price.
• Case-2 represents a SPP-friendly environment in which SPPs are encouraged
to invest in DG units and a SOP is offered to those who sell their energy to
the LDC.
• Case-3 represents a tightly regulated distribution system in which the LDC
is the only entity who can invest and operate DG units; there is no SPP
participation.
In Cases-1 and 2, the LDC must accept all DG-sourced energy from SPPs (fixed
output), whereas in Case-3 the LDC may dispatch DG units (where technology
permits).
Each base case also considers two sub-cases that examine the effects of employing
a carbon tax or intensity-based cap-and-trade mechanism. The first sub-case, T,
considers the government imposing a tax of $50/t on all carbon emissions (CO2capt =
0). The second sub-case, CT, considers the government imposing a cap-and-trade
system which requires participants, the LDC or SPPs, to pay for carbon emissions
72
Table 4.3: SPP Parameters [9], [10], [11]
Diesel Natural Gas Solar Wind
Engine Turbine - CHP PV Turbine
RLDCk 15% → → 15%
Ccf.dg $50k $50k $100k $100k
Ccv.dg $500k $400k $7500k $2000k
Change in
- - -4%/year -1%/year
Ccv.dg
CedgBase $55/MWh → → $55/MWh
CedgIntm $72/MWh → → $72/MWh
CedgPeak $90/MWh → → $90/MWh
Cedg.SOPBase - $40/MWh $365/MWh $54.0/MWh
Cedg.SOPIntm - $40/MWh $348/MWh $38.4/MWh
Cedg.SOPPeak - $80/MWh $330/MWh $20.4/MWh
Codg $90/MWh $75/MWh $4/MWh $10/MWh
CO2dg 0.65t/MWh 0.36t/MWh - -
ECFBase 0.92 0.92 0.05 0.40
ECFIntm 0.92 0.92 0.20 0.30
ECFPeak 0.92 0.92 0.25 0.20
Ls 20 years 20 years 30 years 25 years
W dg.min 0.5 MW → → 0.5 MW
W dg.max 10 MW → → 10 MW
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Table 4.4: Case Studies
Case Objective SOP DG Output
1
CCO2 CO2cap
J1 J2 Fixed Dispatched
1 X - - X - - -
2 X - X X - - -
3 - X - - X - -
1T X - - X - $50/t -
1CT X - - X - $50/t 0.1t/MWh
2T X - X X - $50/t -
2CT X - X X - $50/t 0.1t/MWh
3T - X - - X $50/t -
3CT - X - - X $50/t 0.1t/MWh
1: For dispatchable DG; otherwise dispatch is fixed
Table 4.5: Description of Scenarios
Scenario A: Includes Case-1, 2, and 3.
Scenario B: Includes Case-1T, 1CT, 2T, 2CT, 3T, and 3CT.
Scenario C: CCO2 in Case-2T is varied from $10/t to $110/t.
Scenario D: CCO2 in Case-2CT is varied from $10/t to $110/t.
over and above its 0.1 tonne per MWh allocation (CO2capt > 0). This case assumes
that the market has set the price of carbon credits at $50/t. If a participant
emits less carbon than its allocation, it will also receive $50/t. The nine cases are
summarized in Table 4.4.
Furthermore, there are four scenarios studied in this chapter as summarized in
Table 4.5. Scenario A consists of the cases 1, 2, and 3, as discussed above. Scenario
B consists of cases 1T, 1CT, 2T, 2CT, 3T, and 3CT, also discussed above. Scenario
C is an extension of Case-2T, but considers multiple levels of carbon taxes that may
be set by the government, from $10/t to $110/t, in increments of $20/t. The wide-
range considered here reflects the range seen in real-world implementation.
Unlike carbon costs associated with a carbon-tax mechanism, it should be em-
phasized that carbon credit prices in a cap-and-trade mechanism are not set by
government or regulatory agencies but by market forces. Scenario D considers that
there may be uncertainty in the carbon credit price market and that a wide range of
prices might be experienced. To examine the different effects from different market
conditions, the carbon credit price in Case-2CT is varied from $10/t to $110/t, in
increments of $20/t.
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Resource Usage Min/Max/Avg (s) 3.9/58.6/15.2
Relative Gap Min/Max/Avg (%) 0.1/1.0/0.7
4.3.4 Computational Details
The considered test system was programmed and executed in the GAMS environ-
ment [89], using CPLEX, on an IBM eServer xSeries 460 with 8 Intel Xeon 2.8 Ghz
processors and 3 GB (effective) of RAM. The model and solver statistics, including
minimum, maximum, and average resource usages and relative gaps for all cases
and sub-cases, are given in Table 4.6.
4.4 Results
The results of the case studies presented in this section illustrate the impact of the
policy sets on DG unit investment, energy purchase and dispatch, carbon emissions,
LDC costs and SPP revenues.
4.4.1 Observations from Scenario A
DG Unit Investments
SPP or LDC investments in DG capacity accrued over a 10 year period, for each
case in Scenario A, are given in Figure 4.2. The optimal set of DG investments
obtained for Cases-1, 2, and 3 are given in Table 4.7. Case-1 recommends that
the SPP invest in 17.5 MW of wind DG capacity between year-5 and 10, but none
in the earlier years, which implies wind DG capital costs are too high to support
investments in the near term (i.e. first 4 years). As capital costs reduce due to
advancements in technology, as modelled in this study, wind DG becomes a feasible
option to SPPs without additional incentives.
The non-selection of investments in CHP and solar-PV DG units in Case-1 indi-
cates insufficient income or prohibitively high costs of these technologies to render
them profitable. While capital cost is the main barrier to solar-PV investment,
high operating costs from fuel prices are the main barrier for CHP investment.
Case-2, which is an SPP-friendly environment, recommends that 9.1 MW of
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Figure 4.2: Scenario A and B: Total DG Unit Investments
year, followed by a large investment of 43 MW in solar-PV units spread over years
5 to 10 as additional capacity arises because of increasing energy demand. Clearly,
in comparison to Case-1, the implementation of a FIT at levels set by Ontario’s
SOP is a good incentive to encourage SPP investments in both CHP and wind DG
technology. Conversely, the late investment in solar-PV DG units indicate that the
FIT is not sufficient to offset the high capital costs of solar-PV technology in the
near-term, i.e. in years 1 to 4. However, as advancements in solar-PV technology
lowers its cost, it will become the preferred alternative.
Case-3, representing a tightly regulated system, recommends that the LDC
invests in 4.8 MW of CHP and 10 MW of wind DG units in the first year. This
is followed by small, additional DG unit investments in both CHP and wind units
as need for additional capacity arises because of increasing energy demand. It
is evident that both CHP and wind DG investments are the preferred options
compared to energy purchased from the external grid. It should be noted that
there are no investments in solar-PV units, which can be attributed to their high
capital costs. Also note that total investments are lower than in Case-2, because it
is not financially sensible for the LDC to invest in the same way as an SPP since
it does not receive SOP incentives and cannot fully make up for the additional DG
capital costs by selling its energy to the grid.
Note that diesel engines are not installed by either the LDC or SPP in any of
the scenarios or cases because the cost and CO2 emissions parameters in Table 4.3
make diesel more costly than CHP.
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Table 4.7: Annual DG Unit Investments
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Year CHP PV Wind CHP PV Wind CHP PV Wind
1 - - - 9.1 - 6.4 4.8 - 10
2 - - - - - - - - 4.6
3 - - - - - - - - -
4 - - - - - - - - -
5 - - 10 - 3.8 - - - -
6 - - 6.1 - 34.2 - 0.5 - -
7 - - - - 1.1 - 0.7 - 0.5
8 - - 0.7 - 1.2 - 0.5 - 1.1
9 - - - - 1.2 - 1.0 - -
10 - - 0.7 - 1.2 - - - 1.2
Energy Transactions
Energy imported and exported via the substation and energy generated by DG
units, accrued over 10 years, is given in Fig. 4.3. From an accounting perspective,
these are counted separately, but physically, exports offset imports. In Case-1,
energy generation from DG units is limited by the marginal, later-period wind
investments. In this and all other cases, energy is exported by the LDC to in-
crease capacity for DG investments, as reflected in Eq. (4.7). The increase in DG
production, in Case-2 compared to Case-1, is due to the SPP’s larger and earlier
investments in DG capacity. The increase in exports permit the LDC to accom-
modate greater capacities of DG, which is supported by an increase in imports.
In Case-3, generation from DG units and exports fall slightly compared to Case-2,
reflecting the decrease in installed DG capacity.
Reduction in Carbon Emissions
The reduction in carbon emissions for each case over a 10-year period, given in Fig.
4.4, is measured against a benchmark distribution system which meets its energy
demand solely through energy imported from the external grid/market. Average
emissions intensity for the energy used to meet distribution system demand is also
given in the same figure. Note that since exported energy is not consumed within
the distribution system, the carbon emissions associated with it are not included
in this measurement and are subtracted at the same rate as average emissions from
the bulk electric system.
It is observed that there is an 11% reduction in carbon emissions in Case-1























Import from Grid Generate from DG Export to Grid
Figure 4.3: Scenario A and B: Energy Imports, Exports, and DG Production
clean energy sources, emissions are reduced by only an additional 2.5 percentage
points, to 13.5%. The emissions reduction in Case-2 over Case-1 is only marginal
in spite of the SOP because Case-2 emissions are tempered by the large CHP
investments in year-1. As given in Table 4.2, the external grid sourced energy
has an emission coefficient, COss2 , of 0.2599t/MWh. Given the large monetary
committment involved in encouraging DG, it can be concluded that the SOP is not
very efficient in reducing emissions.
At 16%, the emissions reduction in Case-3 is the largest of the three cases.
Compared to Case-2, there is lesser investment in carbon emitting CHP and greater
investment in wind, hence the larger offset in emissions. It may thus be concluded
that tight integration between the LDC and DG capacity investments may yield
best results in reducing emissions.
Costs and Revenues
LDC cost, SPP profit, and the consumer’s actual cost of electricity (COE, in
¢/kWh) for each case in Scenario A over a 10-year period is presented in Fig-
ure 4.5. Without loss of generality, the SOP’s costs in Case-2 are incurred entirely
by the LDC. It is also counted in the actual COE because it is paid by consumers
(via the government).
In Case-1, the SPP’s profit is negligible compared to the LDC’s cost. As dis-
cussed earlier, wind is the only DG technology that is financially feasible to the
SPP, but only in later years as its capital price drops, so the small profit is ex-
pected. The COE, 7.3¢/kWh, encompasses only the market price for energy (from











































































Figure 4.4: Scenario A and B: Reduction in CO2 Emissions
The SOP, implemented in Case-2, is successful in raising the SPP’s profits,
which can be attributed to investment in technologies supported by the SOP: CHP,
wind, and solar-PV. However, it comes at a significant cost to the LDC, raising its
costs by 45% above its Case-1 cost. Accordingly, the COE rises to 10.9¢/kWh,
an increase of 50%. The SOP is the source of these increased costs, especially the
incentives paid to solar-PV units. Case-3 has the lowest COE, 7.2¢/kWh, which
clearly demonstrates the financial benefit to the LDC and consumers by allowing the
LDC to make DG investments: clean or renewable energy investments at low cost to
the consumer. Instead of relying on FITs to financially encourage DG investments
(Case-2), the financial incentives in Case-3 come from decreased dependence on
power imports from the external grid resulting in overall savings to the LDC and
the consumer.
4.4.2 Observations from Scenario B
DG Unit Investments
Total DG investments in Case-1 are not affected by either a carbon tax (Case-
1T) or a cap-and-trade mechanism (Case-1CT), as seen in Fig. 4.2, since Case-1
optimal investments are all wind DG units. However, emission credits permit earlier
commissioning times of wind DG investments in Case-1CT compared to Case-1.
It is observed that inclusion of either of the two carbon reduction mechanisms to
Case-2 reduces investment capacity in CHP by 3 MW and solar-PV by 9 MW, and
increases wind capacity by 6 MW. The reason behind the reduced CHP investment
is clear: in light of the added costs to carbon emissions, CHP becomes a less viable
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Figure 4.5: Scenario A and B: Costs and Revenues
2, solar-PV is installed in year-5 and 6, displacing energy produced by CHP units
(i.e. CHP is not used to its full capacity after year-5.) When investment in CHP
drops in Case-2T and 2CT due to additional operational costs from carbon taxes,
so does the quantity of energy that solar-PV can displace, therefore its production
level falls and its installed capacity falls to match. This drop in both CHP and
solar-PV capacity opens more room for wind capacity, thus its installed capacity
increases.
Adding a carbon tax mechanism to Case-3, Case-3T, results in 1.3 MW less
investment in both CHP and wind DG units. Like above, the mechanism behind
this reduction is complex. In Case-3, some room is made for capacity investments by
exporting of energy, as seen in Fig. 4.3. Adding a carbon tax to CHP investments
make exporting its energy less viable, leading to a fall in exports. Since allowable
penetration of DG energy is a function of exports, Eq. (4.7), capacity for DG also
drops, hence lowering the investments in wind capacity. It can be concluded that
the cost of wind DG produced energy is low enough to justify using it to offset LDC
imports, but not low enough to justify using it to increase exports. From Case-3T
to Case-3CT, the 2 MW drop in investment of CHP DG and increase by 1.3 MW of
wind capacity is justified by gains the LDC makes by selling its emissions credits.
Essentially, these credits now makes it financially advantageous for wind investment
to replace the CHP capacity that was lost.
Energy Transactions
As seen in Fig. 4.3, there are no changes in energy transactions between Case-1
and 1T (because of identical investment plans). DG production does increase very
slightly in 1CT due to the SPP’s earlier investment in wind capacity, which gives it
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two years worth of extra production. In Case-2T, imports, DG unit production, and
exports decline slightly from Case-2 due to decreased investment in DG technology
(discussed earlier). In Case-2CT, imports, exports, and production rise slightly
compared to 2T due to small increases in investment capacity. Finally, the drop
in imports, exports, and production in Case-3T and 3CT are related to changes to
the mix of DG investments.
Reduction in Carbon Emissions
There are no changes in carbon emissions between Case-1 and 1T (because of
identical investment plans). The reduction in emissions (Fig. 4.4) in Case-1CT
by an additional 2 percentage points can be attributed to the wind DG’s earlier
installation. The large increase in reductions observed in Case 2T and 2CT is a
result of reduced CHP and increased wind investment and production. The drop in
emissions reduction in Case-3T, compared to 3, is due to decreased wind investment.
However, this reduction is recovered in 3CT as investment in carbon emitting CHP
falls and production from wind investment increases, offsetting emissions from bulk
generation.
Costs and Revenues
Imposing either the carbon tax or cap-and-trade mechanism to any of the three
case studies increases both the LDC’s cost and the average COE (refer to Case-1T,
1CT, 2T, 2CT, 3T, and 3CT in Fig. 4.5). This cost increase is due to the LDC’s
dependence on bulk generation (imports from the grid), which is a polluting entity.
The effect of taxes on Case-2T and 3T’s costs is moderated, a little, by the system
having a larger composition of its energy demands met by renewable energy. A
cap-and-trade mechanism, in Case-1CT, 2CT, and 3CT, tempers the effect of a
strict carbon tax, reducing the average COE and LDC costs. Both the LDC and
SPPs make full use of the cap: in the LDC’s case, to reduce costs to the consumers
and the average COE, and in the SPP’s case, to increase the profit of investments.
4.4.3 Observations from Scenario C
Scenario C varies the government imposed carbon tax in Case-2T from $10/t to
$110/t. As observed in Fig. 4.6, investment in CHP capacity drops slowly as the
carbon tax increases, with a significant drop between $70/t and $90/t. Unlike CHP
capacity, the carbon tax rate does not affect the investment schedules of the other
DG units, since their carbon free energy is unaffected by a carbon tax.
Carbon emissions (Fig. 4.7) fall roughly 0.2 percentage points for every $10/t
increase of the carbon tax. It also increases, in a fairly linear manner, LDC costs
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Figure 4.6: Scenario C: Total DG Unit Investments
SPP profit falls very marginally, less than $0.5M, for each $10/t increase in tax, as
it takes away at income from carbon emitting CHP.
4.4.4 Observations from Scenario D
In Scenario D, the cost of carbon credits in Case-2CT is varied from $10/t to $110/t,
reflecting uncertainty in the carbon credit markets. Similar to Scenario C and due
to the same mechanisms, as the cost of emissions increases there is no change in
investment to solar-PV or wind capacity, but progressively lower capacities of CHP
investment (Fig. 4.9). Consistent with the drop in CHP investment, emissions
also falls gradually from 20% to 22% (Fig. 4.10). (The slight increase at $50/t
is from a very slight increase in CHP investment at that point.) The cost to the
LDC increases as it must purchase carbon credits to cover the emissions tied to its
imports of energy from bulk generation (Fig. 4.11). Similarly, the average COE
increases from 10.7¢/kWh to 12.4¢/kWh, or 0.17¢per $10/t increase. Note that
both the LDC costs and average COE are less than that for Scenario C, due to
the capacity credit given to the LDC. There is no impact on the SPP’s profit since
additional costs due to emissions from CHP are offset by lower CHP investment
and capacity credits from its wind and solar-PV units.
4.4.5 Sensitivity of Results
The parameters of the case studies presented in Section 4.3 represent a ‘typical’ On-
tario distribution system. They are realistic but not exact. Since these parameters
may vary over time, location, and between different stakeholders, a few comments
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Figure 4.11: Scenario D: Costs and Revenues
The discount rate, Rdgk , of 15% for SPPs is conservative, meaning that a signif-
icant rate of return is required before an SPP will invest in DG. This discount rate
takes into account investment risks, including higher than anticipated operational
costs, lower than predicted capacity factors, and the use of unproven technology.
Due to their high capital costs, solar-PV and wind turbine DG units are partic-
ularly sensitive to the rate of return, as they rely on future income many years
ahead to break-even. Decreasing the discount rate will result in more solar-PV and
wind turbine DG investments while crowding out CHP DG investment; conversely,
increasing the discount rate will slow solar-PV and wind turbine DG investments
and increase CHP DG investments.
The capital cost of solar-PV and wind turbine DG, Ccdg.v, is large, and thus
their changes will impact the timing of investments. Reducing their costs will bring
earlier investment (crowding out CHP DG), while increasing the capital cost will
delay investment (allowing for more CHP DG investment).
The price paid for energy to SPPs through the SOP is fixed and is not be a source
of uncertainty to the SPP. However, these rates may vary across jurisdictions; vari-
ations will significantly influence investment. Higher SOP rates will lead to earlier
(and larger) investments. Wind and solar-PVs are particularly sensitive to changes
in the SOP since they are relied upon to recover their high capital costs; lower SOP
rates will dramatically reduce investments in these technologies. Similarly, changes
to the capacity factors of wind and solar-PV will alter their investment; lower ECFs
will result in less output per MW capacity, decreasing returns resulting in smaller
and later investments (higher ECFs will have the opposite effect).
The high cost of fuel for diesel engines precludes investment in this technology
for all but backup generation (which is not modelled here). The cost of natural gas
is offset by SOP premiums thus permitting a reasonable rate of return. A drop in
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the price of fuel will make CHP investment more enticing to SPPs, in which case
it will become preferred over investments in other DG technology.
The results of Scenarios C and D, in particular LDC and consumer costs, are
likely sensitive to the base level of carbon emissions; this is discussed below.
4.4.6 Analysis and Discussion
In this subsection, the programs and results will be discussed in light of possible
regulatory objectives: emissions reduction and increased investment in DG.
At the incentive rates discussed in Section 4.1.1, Ontario’s SOP is effective in
increasing investment in CHP and wind technologies (Case-2), which would not
otherwise occur without incentives (Case-1). Except for the solar-PV investments
that are not predicted by the simulations, this corresponds to what is actually
occurring in Ontario. The discrepancy in solar-PV investments may be due to self-
subsidies from investors, e.g., by way of lower discount rates, that are not included
in the model.
If a reduction in carbon emissions from electricity production is the goal of the
SOP (Case-2), it essentially will cost the consumer an additional 3.6¢/kWh for a
mere 1.5 percentage point additional reduction; this translates to a whopping cost
of emissions reduction of $1890/t. It would be far more effective to allow LDCs
(only) to purchase and operate their own DG, saving consumers 0.17¢/kWh com-
pared to a SPP-inclusive environment (Case-1) and reducing emissions by a further
5 percentage points. These results may change in favour of SOPs if associated ben-
efits from CHPs are accounted for. It may be better to design FIT programs to
target only specific technologies, such as CHP. In troubled economic times, it seems
difficult to justify subsidizing solar-PV given the significant financial burden it will
impose. Wind technology, on the other hand, is almost at a point that subsidies will
no longer be required as costs drop due to advances in the technology or economies
of scale.
The implementation of carbon taxes in combination with an existing SOP (Case-
2T) results in a large reduction in emissions, but at the cost of CHP investment.
Furthermore, with a carbon tax of $50/t, as in Case-2T, the cost of reducing emis-
sions is equal to $763/t, which is significantly lower than the Case-2 cost of $1890/t.
If the carbon tax is further increased the incremental benefit is small and will result
in disproportionally increased costs to consumers. If the objective of policy makers
is to reduce carbon emission on a global scale, these carbon taxes must be carefully
designed lest they cut CHP investment.
Imposing a carbon cap-and-trade mechanism in addition to offering the SOP
(Case-2CT) has the same effect on investment as the tax-only scheme (Case-2T).
The only notable difference is a slight increase in CO2 emissions, afforded to the
CHP producer by the cap, and thus reducing its per unit costs. Despite higher
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returns to wind and solar-PV SPP’s through trading of emissions credits, the ap-
plication of the cap-and-trade mechanism does not significantly alter DG investment
because the distribution system is already saturated with DG. It should be noted
that this work does not consider differentiated cap-and-trade schemes applied to one
generation entity and not the other. However, if such discriminatory cap-and-trade
schemes are applied then emissions may increase.
The analysis conducted in Scenario D shows that, at the distribution sys-
tem level, carbon credit prices have little effect on investments, emissions, and
LDC/consumer cost in a SOP environment. Investments in renewable energy DG
change little, and a measurable drop in clean energy DG (CHP) is only experienced
with higher carbon credit prices. The cost to consumers is small at 0.17¢/kWh per
$10/t increase. It can be concluded that volatile credit price markets (within the
ranges explored) bear little risk to governments in terms of meeting carbon reduc-
tion goals and little impact to consumers in terms of program costs. Investment
in renewable energy DG also bears little risk to the SPP (investments are prof-
itable regardless of prices); however, higher credit prices may hurt returns on CHP
investment, and thus risk-adverse SPPs may choose not to invest in this technology.
Results from the model are sensitive to carbon emission rates from bulk gener-
ation and, thus, the results discussed here are particular to Ontario (and Canada,
which has similar rates). Ontario generates relatively clean energy – with most
power originating from hydro and nuclear generation [90]. If a cap-and-trade mech-
anism were to be implemented in Ontario, it is expected that electricity generation
would not be a significant driver of high carbon credit prices regardless of capacity
allocations. The effect of other drivers, such as economic growth and emissions
from other industries is not known, however, and thus the analysis on a range of
carbon credit prices, as above, is necessary.
In jurisdictions where significant electricity supply is through fossil-fuel or coal
based generation, such as in some U.S. states, the impact of carbon tax and cap-and-
trade mechanisms are expected to be different. The implementation of a carbon
tax or the allocation of capacity credits in a cap-and-trade mechanism at levels
similar to those discussed in this research are expected to have a larger impact on
LDC and consumer costs than if implemented in Ontario. Mitigating instruments
may include relaxing the allocation of capacity credits or setting an upper limit on
carbon credit prices; however, for brevity the effects of these options have not been
analyzed.
The most effective policy in reducing emissions and increasing DG investment is
to allow LDCs to build and operate DG to support their distribution system (Case-
3). By investing in DG, LDCs are able to optimally integrate and utilize them to
offset expenses otherwise incurred by importing energy. It allows them to determine
the mix of external grid/market purchased energy versus generation from DG units.
Implementing a tax-only mechanism in this case may have a negative effect on
emissions and hence, in this regulated environment FITs are not required. Creating
partnerships between the LDC and industry may increase CHP investment and
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reduce global emissions. Although integrating the LDC and DG investments is the
cheapest route to achieving emissions and investment goals, it may not be feasible
in all jurisdictions, such as in Ontario, where such a practice may be considered
as unfair competition to SPPs. This conclusion assumes that the LDC is a public
utility, acting in the best interest of its taxpayers and consumers.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presents a distribution system planning model that is suitable for
examining the impact of regulatory policies on DG unit investments by SPPs or
LDCs. By examining these investment decisions, it is possible to determine the
effects of the policies on long-run energy dispatch and purchases and thus predict the
role the policies play on distribution system economics and environmental emissions.
This research examines three major policy cases representing a SPP-inclusive
environment, a SPP-friendly environment incorporating FITs, and a tightly regu-
lated system with only the LDC participating. These cases are applied to a 32-bus
radial distribution system using market and incentive rates currently in place within
Ontario, Canada, implemented under the SOP.
Without additional incentives, it is found that wind DG units are close to being
viable. FITs, such as Ontario’s SOP, are necessary to increase investments in CHP
and solar-PV units (especially in the near term). However, the SOP is found to
be overly costly if its sole purpose is to reduce emissions. Adding either a tax
or cap-and-trade mechanism to the SOP reduces both emissions and energy cost.
The most effective policy case, from the environmental emissions viewpoint, is the
tightly regulated system, with the lowest emission and lowest cost, and with no
FIT necessary.
By successfully encouraging SPPs to invest in DG units, via the policies dis-
cussed in this chapter, a large number of proposals may await LDCs. As the host
utility providing network access to these DG units, LDCs are responsible for ap-
proving connections to their system; however, without systematic coordination a
large number of proposals will lead to technical and economic inefficiencies. The
issue of how best to modify and accept investment proposals so that maximum DG








In the planning model of Chapter 3, the LDC exhibits full control over where it may
place its own DG units and limited control over the placement of SPP-DG units. In
the latter case, placement options for SPP-DG units are pre-determined, with little
negotiation between investing SPPs and between the LDC and investing SPPs. As
is in practice, SPP investment proposals are evaluated by the LDC on a case-by-
case basis; proposals are accepted or rejected based on whether it is technically
feasible to integrate them into the distribution system. Multiple DG unit proposals
are not considered concurrently, and feedback mechanisms between the LDC and
SPPs is minimal. Proposals are not coordinated in a systematic manner so that
approvals are matched with system requirements.
Such arbitrary placement is not optimal from a technical and economic stand-
point, but yet there is no literature reported that develops a coordinated plan for
the approval and absorption of SPP DG proposals taking into consideration the
technical constraints of the LDC’s existing infrastructure and its ability to provide
grid connection to the DG units while keeping its distribution network within op-
erating limits. Connection charges, or tariffs in the form of paybacks or AACRs as
discussed in Chapter 2, can be used by LDCs as incentives to localize DG where it
most benefits the distribution system. One drawback, however, is that such a sys-
tem provides no hard caps; SPPs wishing to place DG units at ‘costlier’ locations
may still do so, and can drive up the costs to the LDC and consumers by forcing
1The work presented in this chapter has been submitted for publication in S. Wong, K. Bhat-
tacharya, and J.D. Fuller, “Coordination of Investor-Owned DG Capacity Growth in Distribution
Systems,” IEEE Trans. on Power Syst., Submitted.
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system upgrades. Furthermore, such a system requires the LDC to have authority
to offer location-based tariffs, which is not always the case. As in Ontario, tariffs
are the responsibility of a regulatory agency and LDCs are only permitted to charge
connection costs.
With more incentive programs being introduced by governments, there will be
an increasing influx of SPPs making DG investments. As has been noted in Chapter
4, the implementation of FITs aimed at encouraging private investment by SPPs in
clean and renewable DG technologies has arguably been a large success in Ontario,
resulting in 428 contracts with a total of 1.4 GW generating capacity, as of February
2009 [94]. Further compounding DG implementation issues is that, in jurisdictions
such as Ontario, LDCs are not permitted to place their own DG units (except
for security and stability reasons) but must accommodate all DG proposals as is
technically feasible.
From the perspectives of regulatory agencies and LDCs, the uncoordinated ap-
proach means that SPP-DG investment may not be realized to their full potential,
resulting in a loss of clean/renewable generation sources. From the perspective of
SPPs, this simple process may result in under-utilized capital and lost opportuni-
ties.
5.1.1 Overview of the Coordination Process
This chapter introduces a new method for coordinating the approval process of DG
proposals submitted by SPPs to the LDC. For practicality, this method considers
that interactions between SPPs and the LDC are for information exchange only
– the SPPs submit their proposals and the LDC advises them of their technical
feasibility. Furthermore, the actions and decisions by the LDC are considered to
be fair, neutral, and transparent. The basic functioning of the proposed method is
as follows:
• SPPs submit their respective proposals to the LDC. They would ideally spec-
ify the location, size, year of commissioning, and production of their proposed
investments. Note that, in real-world implementation, SPPs will follow their
own procedures to devise investment proposals. Here, in order to illustrate
the proposed method, a plausible model is used which assumes, realistically,
that SPPs operating in deregulated markets seek to maximize their profits
(SPP investment module, Fig. 5.1).
• The LDC is responsible for ensuring the distribution system’s operational
feasibility and that constraints are met. It considers the distribution system
demand/supply balance, voltage limits, feeder capacities, and other techni-
cal constraints in its coordination program to verify feasibility of the SPP
proposals (LDC’s DG Coordination Algorithm, Fig. 5.1). The LDC deter-
mines the production cuts required to meet system voltage and feeder limits
using a combination of load flow calculations and the concept of domains and
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 Figure 5.1: Overview of SPP and LDC Algorithms
commons [99]. These cuts are assigned to those DG units which are most
responsible for the infeasibilities.
• These production cuts are then passed to the SPPs, at which point they revise
their proposals accordingly. They may a) accept the production cuts, b) revise
production and or/location of DG unit(s), or c) drop DG unit proposal(s)
altogether.
• This process is then repeated until no further revisions are required from the
SPPs. If there are feeder overloads, but they cannot be mitigated through
production cuts, then the LDC is responsible for making the necessary feeder
upgrades.
The proposed methodology uses a number of assumptions pertaining to the
SPPs and the LDC:
• SPPs operate independently from each other and one is not significantly larger
than the other– if SPPs operate independently from one another, and they
are relatively equal in size, then the potential for collusion amongst SPPs by
crowding out others is minimized. Rules on FIT program participation can
be appropriately designed to address this issue.
• SPPs do not share system buses with one another, i.e. there is only one DG
unit proposal per bus.
• The system load flow is feasible, neglecting feeder capacities, up to the plan-
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ning horizon, without additional SPP investment. In essence, the LDC has
plans to meet its future demand without relying on the participation of SPPs.
• Imports and exports from substation(s) and intertie(s) are cost optimized
(amongst themselves) to meet remaining system demand not met by DG
proposals; however, they will not redistribute energy flows (amongst them-
selves) to avoid feeder overload due to the DG proposals.
• SPP DG unit proposals with production less than demand at the sited bus
cannot be constrained by the LDC; they are directly approved.
• Feeder upgrades, when deemed necessary, are the responsibility of the LDC.
• Only active power flows are considered when maintaining feeder limits.
5.2 Description of the Proposed DG
Coordination Scheme
The proposed coordination framework comprises one SPP module pertaining to
SPP specific DG unit investments (described in Section 5.3.1) and four modules
pertaining to the LDC’s DG Coordination Algorithm (DGCA, discussed in Sections
5.3.2 to 5.3.5). The four modules forming the basis of the DGCA are the Power
Flow, Domains and Commons, DG Output Reduction, and Feeder Build modules.
The DGCA, showing the relationships between each module, is presented in Fig.
5.2.
5.2.1 SPP Investment Module
The SPP Investment Module mimics SPPs’ decisions by choosing projects that
maximize their individual profits, which are modelled to be independent of one
another. This module outputs the DG unit proposal(s) for each SPP, which includes
the unit’s proposed site, size, commissioning date, and production schedule over the
planning period. However, only DG unit site(s) and schedule(s) are forwarded to
the LDC for co-ordination. It takes as constraints DG unit production limits set
by the LDC’s DGCA.
5.2.2 LDC Coordination Modules
The proposals, after being submitted to the LDC by SPPs, must first be collated
before they can be read by the LDC modules: for every combination of i and k, a
generator index, g, is assigned and the SPP decision variable pdgk,i,b,t is transformed
into parameter P dgg,b,t. Once collated, the proposals are forwarded to the Power
Flow Module and β, which counts the number of updates to the DG unit production
limits in the current round, is reset to zero. If DG production limits are set, either by
the Power Flow Module or the DG Output Reduction Module, β is incremented by
92
 
Figure 5.2: Details of DG Coordination Algorithm
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one. A value of β ≥ 1 indicates that the SPPs must consider additional constraints
and submit revised proposals.
The Power Flow Module solves for the optimal power flow of the distribution
system, using full load flow equations, and determines feeder power flows. DG
unit production, P dgg,b,t, is treated as a parameter subject to reductions, P.rdn
dg
g,b,t,
required to meet the limits, P dg.maxk,i,b,t , set by the DG Output Reduction Model.
DG production limits may also be set within the Power Flow Module itself, as
required, to prevent bus over-voltages. Once the optimal power flow has been
solved, feeder capacities are subtracted from feeder power flows determine feeder
overloads, P.ovldfdr, if any. If an overload exists then the distribution system power
flow data is forwarded to the Domains and Commons Module.
The Domains and Commons Module is used to determine the contributions of
SPP DG unit proposals to feeder overloads. If SPP DG unit proposals are indeed
responsible, then a dataset listing feeder overloads and their DG unit contributions
are forwarded to the DG Output Reduction Module. Conversely, if overloads cannot
be attributed to specific SPP DG unit proposals but there are updated production
limits, indicated by β ≥ 1, then the whole algorithm is repeated, starting with the
SPP Investment Modules. If there are no updated production limits, i.e. β = 0,
the Feeder Build Module is run to determine the required feeder upgrades, wfdr(i,j),t.
The DG Output Reduction Module is responsible for finding the DG unit pro-
duction cuts, p.rdndgg,b,t, necessary to reduce feeder overload. This variable, p.rdn
dg
g,b,t,
is subtracted from the DG unit production parameter, P dgg,b,t, to arrive at the DG
unit production limits, P dg.maxk,i,b,t , that are passed to the LDC’s Power Flow Module
and the SPP Investment Module.
If no feeder overloads exist, then the current LDC coordination round is con-
cluded: if β = 0, the process is complete and proposals accepted; if β ≥ 1, revisions
to DG unit proposals, using the updated production limits, are required from the
SPPs.
5.3 Mathematical Description of Modules
5.3.1 SPP Investment Module
Objective Function
The objective function is maximizing discounted sum of the SPP’s profits, JA, in
Eq. (5.1). It is assumed that a SPP only specializes in one technology and therefore,
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(1 + RSPPk )
(H−t+1)
∀ k, t : t + Lsdgk ≥ H (5.2)
else : αdgk,t = 0 (5.3)
Line a○ in (5.1) represents the SPPs’ income from the sale of energy (composed
of the market price of energy and applicable FITs) net of operation and maintenance
costs. Line b○ is the capital cost from building the DG units, which includes both
per unit ($/MW) and EPC fixed ($) costs. The (1 + RSPPk ) factor accrues capital
costs to the beginning of each year (whereas energy income is accrued at year-end).
To mitigate the end-effects from this module’s finite planning horizon, the savage
value of the units at the horizon, Eqs. (5.2) and (5.3), are subtracted from the
capital costs.
DG Build
Constraint (5.4) ensures that total investment in a certain technology at the same
site is limited while (5.5) ensures that the EPC costs are included in the objective






k ∀k ∈ K, i ∈ N (5.4)
wdgk,i,t ≤ z
dg
k,i,tM ∀k ∈ K, i ∈ N, t ∈ T (5.5)
DG Energy Limits





wdgk,i,t′ ∀k ∈ K, i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.6)
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Fuel availability will impact energy production by a DG unit. For example, wind
speed and solar radiation levels vary considerably by location throughout the day,
thus impacting the production from wind and solar-PV DG. An expected capacity
factor averaged out over peak, intermediate, and base load periods, for each bus, is
used. For non-dispatchable units, such as wind and solar-PV DG, the ECF dictates
the unit’s production (based on size), as in (5.7). For dispatchable units, such as
bio-gas and CHP, the ECF sets an upper limit on energy production, as in (5.8).




wdgk,i,tHrsb ∀k ∈ K
nd, i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.7)




wdgk,i,tHrsb ∀k ∈ K, i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.8)
The LDC may constrain, via the DGCA, the power produced by proposed SPP
DG units in (5.9). If the DG unit affected is non-dispatchable, it may, in conjunction
with (5.7), reduce the unit’s maximum size. For dispatchable units, only energy
production will be limited, although with all else unchanged there may be excess
capacity. The full impact of this constraint is determined via JA, as the SPP may
choose a new site, cut production, or reduce proposed unit sizes.
P dgk,i,b,t ≤ P
dg.max
k,i,b,t ∀k ∈ K, i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.9)
SPP Capital Budget
Constraint (5.10) ensures that the present value of capital expenditures in DG units
















∀k ∈ K (5.10)
Variable Limits
Variables P dgk,i,b,t and w
dg
k,i,t are positive; z
dg
k,i,t is binary.
5.3.2 LDC Power Flow Module
The Power Flow Module is the first component of the LDC’s DGCA, and solves
for the optimal load flow of the distribution system. It takes, as a parameter, the
SPPs’ production schedule subject to DG unit production limits (set by the DG
Output Reduction Module or by a previous run of the Power Flow Module).
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Objective Function

































Lines c○ and d○, in (5.11), represent the cost of importing energy from the
market, via substations, or neighbouring LDC’s, via interties, respectively. If en-
ergy is exported from the distribution system, via these elements, then the income
is credited to the LDC. Cost of reactive power supply, from capacitor banks, in
represented by e○. Since power purchased from the SPPs is a parameter for the
LDC, this component is not included in the objective function.
In this module, it is possible for unchecked SPP DG unit production to cause
bus over-voltages by violation of constraint (5.14). To prevent this, the load flow
equation (5.12) permits the solver to constrain-off DG unit production, through
the variable P.codgg,b,t, and thus maintain a feasible solution. However, a high cost,
Mdg.cob,t , for constraining DG unit production off through P.co
dg
g,b,t, is required to
ensure that DG units are constrained-off only to prevent voltage problems, in f○.
Load Flow Equations
Power flows are modelled using full load flow equations, for each load demand
block and year, as shown in (5.12) and (5.13). Active power imports/exports, in
(5.12), can be met by a combination of substation and intertie exchanges or DG
unit production (subject to DG unit coordination limits). The variable P.rdndgg,b,t is
calculated as the difference between the DG unit production parameter P dgg,b,t and
limits P dg.maxk,i,b,t imposed in earlier iterations of the LDC modules. Reactive power
is supplied via installed capacitor banks, in (5.13), since substation and intertie
buses ideally operate at unity power factor and (in the absence of a reactive power
market) DG units will only supply active power.
97



















Gg(i,j)cos(θi,b,t − θj,b,t) + Bb(i,j)sin(θi,b,t − θj,b,t)
)
∀i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.12)








Gg(i,j)sin(θi,b,t − θj,b,t) + Bb(i,j)cos(θi,b,t − θj,b,t)
)
∀i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.13)
Voltage Limits
Proper voltage profiles are maintained through Eqs. (5.14) and (5.15).
Vi,b,t ≤ V
max ∀i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.14)
Vi,b,t ≥ V
min ∀i ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.15)
Substation, Intertie, and Capacitor Limits
Substations and interties are modelled as bi-directional and can handle exchanges
up to their capacity in either direction. Substation and intertie limits, Eqs. (5.16)
to (5.19), can also be modelled as unidirectional by changing the right-hand-side
of (5.17) and (5.19) to zero without loss of generality to this or other modules.
Reactive power output of the capacitor banks are limited in (5.20).
P ssi,b,t ≤ W
ss
i,t ∀i ∈ N
ss, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.16)
P ssi,b,t ≥ −W
ss
i,t ∀i ∈ N
ss, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.17)
P inti,b,t ≤ W
int
i,t ∀i ∈ N
int, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.18)
P inti,b,t ≥ −W
int
i,t ∀i ∈ N
int, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.19)
Qcapi,b,t ≤ W
cap
i,t ∀i ∈ N
cap, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.20)
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DG Constrained-off Limits
Equation (5.21) ensures that a DG unit is not constrained by more than its sched-





g,b,t ∀g ∈ G, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.21)
Variable Limits
Variables P ssi,b,t, P
int
i,b,t, and θi,b,t are unrestricted; Q
cap
i,b,t, Vi,b,t, and P.cog,b,t are positive.
5.3.3 LDC Domains and Commons Module
This module draws upon the work of Kirschen et al. [99], whom use a system of
commons and domains to estimate the contribution of individual generators to loads
and feeder power flows. The algorithm used in this module remains unchanged from
[99] except for modifications to treat substations and interties as either generators
or loads depending on the power flow direction.
The input to this module is the solution from the Power Flow Module. The
output of interest is the contribution, Cntrbdg.fdr
g,(i,j),b,t, (as a fraction of total load) of
each DG unit to feeder power flows, particularly those that are overloaded.
Due to the non-linear nature of power flows and the linear nature of the commons
and domains algorithm, the contribution factors would not hold true for significant
changes in system power flows. To mitigate these effects, the contribution factors
are updated after every adjustment to DG unit production (per load block, per
year) by the DG Output Reduction Module, as given in the Fig. 5.2.
5.3.4 LDC DG Output Reduction Module
The DG Output Reduction Module is entrusted with reducing feeder overload(s) by
constraining the DG production of the single largest contributor to the overloads
per load block and year, while also keeping the reduction in DG production to a
minimum. The feeder overloads, P.ovldfdr, using data from the Power Flow Mod-
ule, are calculated by subtracting feeder capacities from feeder power flows. The
module’s primary inputs are the DG unit production schedules, feeder overloads
and their limits, and the contribution of each DG unit to the overloads. The output
from this module specifies the DG(s) whose production is to be constrained and
its production limit, P dg.maxk,i,b,t , which is calculated by subtracting P.sub
dg
g,b,t from the
DG unit production parameter, P dgg,b,t.
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Objective Function
JC , in (5.22), is a multi-criteria objective function. Its goal is to minimize remaining
feeder overloads, P.ovldfdr by subtracting the least amount of DG unit production,
P.subdg. Priority, however, is placed on reducing feeder overloads as set through









M rdn P.ovldfdr.r(i,j),b,t (5.22)
Power Output Reduction Limit
Equation (5.23) ensures that a DG unit is not constrained by more than its sched-





g,b,t ∀g ∈ G, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.23)
Unit Reduction Limit
To ensure that contribution factors from the Domains and Commons Module are
always accurate, production from only one DG unit, per load block per year, can




z.rdndgg,b,t ≤ 1 ∀b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.24)
P.subdgg,b,t ≤ z.rdn
dg
g,b,tM ∀g ∈ G, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.25)
P.subdgg,b,tM ≥ z.rdn
dg
g,b,t ∀g ∈ G, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.26)
Feeder Overload Reduction Limits
The reduction to the power flow overload on a feeder is limited to the reduction
in feeder power flow from reducing DG unit production, in (5.27). This limit is
calculated by summing the reduction of each DG unit’s production against the
contribution of that unit to the feeder load. It should be reminded that cuts to a






g,(i,j),b,t) ∀i, j ∈ N, b ∈ B, t ∈ T (5.27)
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The second limit, in (5.28), requires the reduction in feeder overload plus re-












(i,j),b,t are positive; z.rdn
dg
g,b,t is binary.
5.3.5 LDC Feeder Build Module
The LDC may not be able to mitigate feeder overloads by reducing DG unit produc-
tion, e.g., if production is less than demand (as per the assumption in Section 5.1).
Under this circumstance, the LDC has no choice but to increase feeder capacity as
required. The DG coordination algorithm may call this Feeder Build Module, if
necessary, as its last step.
Objective Function
The objective function, JD in (5.29), is to minimize the increase in feeder capacity.
Combined with (5.31), it minimizes the number of feeder upgrades. The symbol







This constraint ensures that increases to feeder capacity are sufficient to meet feeder







∀i, j ∈ N : ∃(i, j), b ∈ B, t ∈ T : P.ovldfdr(i,j),b,t > 0 (5.30)
To minimize build costs to the LDC, only one upgrade per single feeder is





(j,i),t ≤ 1 ∀i, j ∈ N : ∃(i, j) (5.31)
wfdr(i,j),t ≤ z
fdr
(i,j),tM ∀i, j ∈ N : ∃(i, j), t ∈ T (5.32)
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Table 5.1: 32-Bus System and LDC Parameters
Market price of energy, Cessb Base: $55/MWh
Intm: $72/MWh
Peak: $90/MWh
Horizon, H 5 years
Hours in year, Hrsb Base: 4380; Intm: 3504; Peak: 876
Year-0 demand, Pd (MW) Base: 18.58; Intm: 31.58; Peak: 37.15
Growth in Pd 3% per year, uniform across all loads
LDC discount rate, RLDC 8%
Voltage limits, Vmax/Vmin 1.03/0.98 p.u.
Capacitor capacity, W cap 1 MVar (all buses)
Intertie capacity, W int 5 MW
Substation capacity, W ss 45 MW
Variable Limits




A 32-bus radial distribution system, in Fig. 5.3, is used to validate the proposed
DG coordination algorithm. It consists of a transmission grid-connected 45 MW
substation at bus-1 and a 5 MW intertie at bus-30; both the substation and the
intertie are bi-directional. Year-0 demand of the distribution system is 37 MW with
a 3% annual growth in demand over the 5 year planning horizon. With the aid of 1
MVar capacitors installed at all buses, the distribution system load flow is feasible
through the planning horizon without additional generator, substation, or intertie
capacity. Additional LDC parameters are given in Table 5.1.
There are four SPPs willing to invest in the LDC system; their parameters
are given in Table 5.2. Each SPP is exclusive to one technology and the bud-
get of each allows for significant investment in corresponding generating units of
that technology. All SPPs have different discount rates. The low discount rate
of SPP4, necessary to induce investments in solar-PV because of its high capital
cost, reflects a self-subsidy by the investor. The ECF adjustment, ECF adj, for
each SPP reflects availability of the bus to each SPP (zero if it is not available)
combined with geographical factors affecting DG unit production. Actual ECF is
calculated by multiplying the adjustment by the maximum ECF, in Table 5.3, of



























































Figure 5.3: 32-Bus Radial Distribution System: No SPP Participation. The circled
numbers denote bus numbers. Year-5 peak power flows and year-0 feeder sizes (in
brackets) are denoted beside each feeder, in MW.
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Table 5.2: SPP Parameters
SPP1 SPP2 SPP3 SPP4
Technology Bio-Gas Nat. Gas CHP Wind Turbine Solar-PV
Budget, BgtSPP $10M $2M $40M $80M
Horizon, H – 5 years –
Discount rate, RSPP 8% 12% 10% 3%
ECF adjbus-3 0 0 0.94 0
ECF adjbus-4 0 0 0 1.00
ECF adjbus-5 0 0 0 1.00
ECF adjbus-14 0 0 0.92 0
ECF adjbus-15 0 0 0.94 0
ECF adjbus-16 0 0 0.95 0
ECF adjbus-23 1.00 0 0 0
ECF adjbus-24 1.00 0 0 0
ECF adjbus-27 0 0.96 0 0
ECF adjbus-28 0 0.98 0 0
ECF adjbus-29 0 1.00 0 0
ECF adjbus-31 0 0 0.98 0
ECF adjbus-32 0 0 1.00 0
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Table 5.3: DG Unit Parameters [9], [10], [11], [12], [92]
Technology Bio-Gas Natural Wind Solar-
Gas CHP Turbine PV
EPC cost, Ccepc.dg $100k $50k $100k $100k
Capital cost, Ccv.dg $4,000k $400k $2,000k $7,500k
Decrease
in Ccv.dg
1%/year - 1%/year 4%/year
Energy price, CedgBase $55/MWh → → $55/MWh
CedgIntm $72/MWh → → $72/MWh
CedgPeak $90/MWh → → $90/MWh
FIT, Cedg.FITBase $55.4/MWh $40/MWh $55.4/MWh $365/MWh
Cedg.FITIntm $38.4/MWh $40/MWh $38.4/MWh $348/MWh
Cedg.FITPeak $20.4/MWh $80/MWh $20.4/MWh $330/MWh
Operating cost, Codg 0 $75/MWh $10/MWh $4/MWh
ECFmaxBase 0.92 0.92 0.40 0.05
ECFmaxIntm 0.92 0.92 0.30 0.20
ECFmaxPeak 0.92 0.92 0.20 0.25
Lifespan, Ls 20 years 20 years 25 years 30 years
Max size, Wmax.dg 10 MW 10 MW 10 MW 10 MW
DG parameters, arranged by technology, are given in Table 5.3. These parame-
ters are used only by the SPP to aid in their investment decisions and production
scheduling. Two prices for energy are given: Cedg, the market price for energy, and
CeFIT , the incentive payment to SPPs from the feed-in-tariff. The net operational
and fuel cost for bio-gas is zero, since costs are assumed to be offset by gate fees for
fuel and income from selling the by-products as fertilizer. The ECF given for each
technology is its maximum technical limit; locational factors, as given in Table 5.2,
may reduce these further. It has been assumed that DG unit sizes must be 10 MW
or under.
5.4.1 Computational Details
The proposed DG coordination algorithm was programmed and executed in the
GAMS environment [89] on an IBM eServer xSeries 460 with 8 Intel Xeon 2.8 Ghz
processors and 3 GB (effective) of RAM. Table 5.4 gives the solver used for each
module and model statistics for a single run of each module.
The SPP Investment Module and DG Output Reduction Modules are MILP
and the Power Flow Module is a NLP. The Commons and Domains Module, not
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Table 5.4: Model Statistics - Initial Run
SPP Inv. Power Flow DG Output
Module Module Rdn. Module
Solver CPLEX MINOS CPLEX
Type MILP NLP MILP
Blocks of Equations 8 13 7
Blocks of Variables 4 7 5
Single Equations 5,573 2,581 366
Single Variables 3,201 1,561 261
Non-Zero Elements 17,906 N/A 890
Discrete Variables 640 N/A 90
Generation Time (s) 0.125 0.094 0.016
Resource Usage (s) 0.140 6.844 0.046
Relative Gap (%) 0.0017 N/A 0.
shown in the table, uses mainly parameter arithmetic and thus model statistics are
not available; the run-time of a single run of this module is a few seconds. The
total run-time for this framework is a few minutes, about half of which is spent
on the compilation and reading of data. Computational burden is not an issue in
implementing this framework.
5.5 Results and Discussion
5.5.1 Process
The proposed DGCA was executed and it was seen that three submissions by the
SPPs were required before an optimal solution was reached. The process required
for this test system, corresponding to the flow chart in Fig 5.2, is as follows:
Round 1 - Initial Proposal
SPPs’ Investment Module
LDC DG Coordination Algorithm (2 runs)
Power Flow Module
Domains and Commons Module
DG Output Reduction Module
Power Flow Module
Round 2 - Revision 1
SPPs’ Investment Module
LDC DG Coordination Algorithm (3 runs)
Power Flow Module
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Domains and Commons Module
DG Output Reduction Module
Power Flow Module




In the first round, two iterations of the LDC’s DGCA are required before a
set of production constraints are returned to the SPPs for proposal revision. The
iterations are required to ensure that the decisions by the DG Output Module use
accurate data from the Power Flow Modules and subsequent Domains and Com-
mons Module. After the SPPs submit their revised proposals (first revision) three
iterations are required by the LDC’s DGCA before an additional set of production
constraints (reflecting the changes from their initial proposal) can be sent back to
them. The SPPs’ third proposal (second revision) is checked via the LDC’s Power
Flow Module and is found to be acceptable as-is. No feeder upgrades are necessary.
5.5.2 SPP-DG Participation
The initial, first revision, and second revision DG build proposals are given in Table
5.5. The DG production limits appended after each round, determined by the LDC
via the DGCA, are given in Table 5.6. Where there is no limit given, no limit
is imposed. These limits are passed to the SPPs at the end of each round. In
Table 5.5, it is noted that SPP1’s 2.5 MW DG unit is moved from bus-23 to 24,
even though no production limits are imposed (in Table 5.6); this relocation occurs
because the present worth at either bus is the same and thus the choice between
the two is arbitrary.
SPP2’s CHP DG unit is shifted from bus-29, to bus-28, and finally to bus-27
as the SPP maximizes its production in light the production limits imposed by the
LDC in Table 5.6. Although both bus-28 and bus-29 have higher ECFs than bus-
27, it is obvious that, given the limits, bus-27 can produce more and is financially
the best site. SPP3 initially proposes two units of 10 MW each at bus-31 and
bus-32 because these buses have the highest ECF. However, both of these sites had
at least one production limit of zero (Table 5.6), and since wind-turbines are not
dispatchable both sites must be rejected. The SPP’s second choice, bus-15 and
bus-16, are again constrained: bus-15 cannot have any production and bus-16 is
partially constrained. Since bus-16 has a higher ECF than the remaining options,
a DG unit of 6.7 MW is approved. SPP3’s remaining capital is spent on DG units
at the bus-2 remaining buses, bus-3 and bus-14.
The DG unit proposals by SPP4 were not the source of any feeder overloads
and thus were not subject to any production limits, thus the proposals remained
unchanged throughout the process and were approved as-is. The proposed year of
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Table 5.5: SPP-DG Unit Proposals
Proposal Initial Revision 1 Rev. 2 (Final)
Size (MW) Yr Size (MW) Yr Size (MW) Yr
SPP1 (Bus-23) - - 2.5 1 2.5 1
SPP1 (Bus-24) 2.5 1 - - - -
SPP2 (Bus-27) - - - - 4.9 1
SPP2 (Bus-28) - - 4.9 1 - -
SPP2 (Bus-29) 4.9 1 - - - -
SPP3 (Bus-3) - - - - 10.0 1
SPP3 (Bus-14) - - - - 3.3 1
SPP3 (Bus-15) - - 10.0 1 - -
SPP3 (Bus-16) - - 10.0 1 6.7 1
SPP3 (Bus-31) 10.0 1 - - - -
SPP3 (Bus-32) 10.0 1 - - - -
SPP4 (Bus-4) 10.0 3 10.0 3 10.0 3
SPP4 (Bus-5) 2.8 3 2.8 3 2.8 3
commissioning for its DG units, in year-3, are due to the declining costs of solar-PV
technology (at years-1 and 2 investment is not profitable).
The placement of SPP-DG to year-5 and their corresponding sizes within the
32-bus radial distribution system, according to their initial proposals and uncon-
strained by the DGCA, are shown in Fig. 5.4. Peak load power flows are also shown
next to each line segment and in bold if overloaded. Fig. 5.5 depicts SPP-DG when
placed according to the final proposals, as determined by the DGCA. It is clearly
seen in these figures that the DGCA is siting DG units away from feeders (27,28),
(28,29), and (29,30) that are overloaded and into feeder branches that have extra
capacity.
The LDC’s import schedule and each SPPs’ production/contract schedules for
each load demand block in years 1 to 5, once proposals have been finalized and
approved, are given in Table 5.7. All of the SPP’s DG units are scheduled to
produce at full capacity once built, maximizing their respective incomes. Note
that the coordination algorithm is not impeding the SPP’s ability to make a profit.
Imports via the substation and intertie are used to meet the remaining load demand.
Intertie imports are maximized at 5 MW for intermediate and peak load demand
blocks to minimize losses and thus costs to the LDC, which is possible because
it lies towards the end of a feeder branch. The lower imports from substations
and interties during the base period reflects lower demand and unchanged DG unit
injections.
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Table 5.6: DG Unit Production Limits
Added SPP Bus Load Block Yr Limit (MW)







SPP-3 31 Intm 1-5 0.0
Peak 1-4 0.0
Peak 5 0.9
SPP-3 32 Base 1-5 0.0
Round 2 SPP-2 28 Base 1-5 0.0
SPP-3 15 Base 1-5 0.0































































Figure 5.4: 32-Bus Radial Distribution System: SPP-DG as per initial proposals.



























































Figure 5.5: 32-Bus Radial Distribution System: SPP-DG as per Approved Propos-
als. The year-5 peak power flows are indicated beside each feeder, in MW.
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Table 5.7: LDC’s Import and SPPs’ Production/Contract Schedules
Supply Bus Demand Year/Supply (MW)
Element Level 1 2 3 4 5
Substation 1 Base 3.62 3.92 3.80 4.15 4.52
(Import) Intm 15.42 16.41 14.85 15.91 17.00
Peak 23.25 24.44 22.41 23.67 24.97
Intertie 30 Base 1.39 1.67 1.75 2.00 2.26
(Import) Intm 5.00 → → → 5.00
Peak 5.00 → → → 5.00
SPP-1 23 All 2.30 → → → 2.30
SPP-2 27 All 4.31 → → → 4.31
SPP-3 3 Base 3.76 → → → 3.76
Intm 2.82 → → → 2.82
Peak 1.88 → → → 1.88
14 Base 1.22 → → → 1.22
Intm 0.91 → → → 0.91
Peak 0.61 → → → 0.61
26 Base 2.56 → → → 2.56
Intm 1.92 → → → 1.92
Peak 1.28 → → → 1.28
SPP-4 4 Base - - 0.50 0.50 0.50
Intm - - 2.00 2.00 2.00
Peak - - 2.50 2.50 2.50
5 Base - - 0.14 0.14 0.14
Intm - - 0.55 0.55 0.55


























Figure 5.6: SPP Energy Production for Years 1-5
5.5.3 Impacts on the Distribution System
This section examines the impact of the DG-coordination framework on various
aspects of distribution system planning. It compares the effect of the final, ac-
cepted SPP proposals versus the effects of the hypothetical, initial, constrained
SPP proposals. The constraints applied to the initial proposals are those required
for the system to be feasible, e.g., feeder and voltage limits adhered to. The initial,
constrained SPP proposal is the upper limit on participation, since it may not be
technically or economically feasible for the DG unit to be so constrained.
Fig. 5.6 compares the total energy production of the initial and final proposals
for each SPP over five years. The energy production of SPP1 and SPP4, whose pro-
duction schedules went unconstrained through the process, is even. The DGCA’s
impact is demonstrated through SPP2 and SPP3, whose production increases signif-
icantly. Total additional SPP participation, made possible through the framework,
increases more than 200 GWh. This production is possible due to the changes
in DG unit siting by the DGCA, alleviating feeder overloads thus permitting in-
creases in SPP production. This framework clearly and appreciably increases SPP
participation, meeting an objective of this model.
Energy imported by the LDC, via the substation and intertie, are given in Fig.
5.7. As expected, imports are reduced considerably: 200 GWh over five years. By
allowing the LDC to defer capacity upgrades, this could be of considerable financial
benefit to the LDC.
Another possible benefit to the DG coordination framework is a reduction in
losses (a byproduct of increased DG penetration). Distribution system losses, with
no DG, DG units as per initial proposals (constrained), and accepted proposals,
are given in Fig. 5.8. Note that losses are initially low because of the significant

























Figure 5.7: LDC Energy Import for Years 1-5
when DG units are introduced as per the initial proposal, and further reduced, by
half, after the coordination framework is run.
Finally, the DGCA has a positive impact on the distribution system’s voltage
profile, as seen in Fig. 5.9. The additional DG unit production apportioned by the
framework provides significant voltage support to the system.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presents a framework for the coordination, by the LDC, of DG in-
vestments received from SPPs. The proposed framework, the DGCA, utilizes a
feedback mechanism between the LDC and SPPs to maximize their participation
and the penetration of DG units into the distribution system. Feedback, from
the LDC, is in the form of production constraints which the SPP must adhere to.
Obeying these constraints, it is left to the SPP to choose the best unit size, site,
and production schedule to reach their objective, presumably, maximizing profit.
The LDC makes use of the notion of commons and domains to isolate sources of
feeder overloads and prioritize production constraints.
It is demonstrated, through a 32-bus test distribution system, that the frame-
work is effective in improving the siting and sizing of DG units over a system
with no coordination, allowing for a considerable increase in energy production.
The framework, while also decreasing distribution system losses and improving its

















































Policy shifts, together with advancements in DG, are forcing changes to the design
and planning of distribution systems. This thesis examines distribution system
planning in the context of these changes, specifically addressing the impact of in-
vestments in DG units by either LDCs or SPPs. In Chapter 1, the concept of the
distribution system and its role in the bulk electric system in introduced. This is
followed by an examination of the two major factors affecting its planning: DG
technology and power industry deregulation.
In Chapter 2, a review of literature addressing distribution system planning
is presented. It is observed that traditional planning methods are typically fo-
cused on minimization of infrastructure costs and losses subject to power flow,
feeder, and substation constraints. However, deregulation has resulted in energy
costs being considered alongside infrastructure costs, and additional DG supply
alternatives added to substation options. Policy instruments used to encourage
investment in clean and renewable energy sources, such as FITs, RECs/TGCs, and
tender/bidding methods, is also reviewed in this chapter. FITs are found to be
favoured in literature, although both FITs and RECs are widely used by govern-
ments.
A framework for the planning of distribution systems, from the LDC’s point of
view, is proposed in Chapter 3. The framework comprises two stages, the SPPM
and the CPPM. The SPPM is responsible for determining the site and year of com-
missioning of future distribution system elements, whereas the CPPM is responsible
for finalizing element sizing and production. The proposed framework will be of in-
terest to both utility planners and policy makers. Planners can use this framework
to plan capital investments and determine optimal energy production or contract
schedules. Policy makers can use the framework, aided by a generalized approach
to the modelling of policies, to formulate regulations that induce stakeholders to
meet predefined goals.
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Chapter 4 proposes a model for analyzing the long term effects of policies on
DG investment within distribution systems, from the point of view of the regulator.
A number of case studies are analyzed, including investment in an SPP-inclusive
environment, where SPPs can invest in DG at market rates; investment in an SPP-
friendly environment, where SPPs are offered incentives to invest in DG through
FITs; and investment in a tightly regulated system, where the LDC is the only
entity permitted to invest in DG (without incentives). All case studies are also
subjected to cap-and-trade and carbon tax mechanisms. It is found that solely
permitting LDCs to invest in DG is the most efficient policy. Correspondingly,
FITs, especially at levels similar to Ontario’s, are found to be a very expensive way
to reduce carbon emissions. It is also found that uncertainty of carbon credit prices
in a cap-and-trade system bore little risks to consumers (with regard to electricity
price) and to governments (with regard to meeting emissions goals); however, CHP
producers do bear some risk.
A framework that LDCs can use to coordinate SPP-DG investment proposals,
the DGCA, is proposed in Chapter 5. Composed of four modules, the DGCA ver-
ifies the feasibility of proposals; if a proposal is not feasible, it works with SPPs,
via feedback, to resize or relocate proposals within the distribution system. It is
demonstrated that employing the DGCA can significantly increase SPP-DG invest-
ment and production, as well as decrease system losses and improve voltage profile
(when compared to a system with no coordination).
6.2 Main Contributions of Thesis
The main contributions of the research presented in this thesis are as follows:
a) A comprehensive, two stage framework for the long term planning of distri-
bution systems is proposed, bridging the gap between traditional distribu-
tion planning frameworks and methods for siting DG within the distribution
system. The framework is fully dynamic and determines parameters for
planning considering multiple distribution system elements; it can be used
to site and/or consider both LDC and SPP-DG units.
b) The two stage framework, generic in nature, can be used by both the LDC
to set long term plans and by regulators to analyze the effects of policy
directives.
c) A new modelling framework is proposed for analyzing the effect of FITs, car-
bon taxes, and cap-and-trade mechanisms on LDC and SPP-DG investments
within the context of distribution systems. The proposed model can be used
by regulators to assist in predicting the effect of policies and consequently
determine their ideal formulation.
d) The effect of FITs on DG investments by SPPs, on different technologies,
are addressed. Capacity growth, emissions impacts, cost to consumers, and
effectiveness of incentives are discussed.
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e) Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade mechanisms, in combination with FITs,
are analyzed and discussed within the context of programs proposed and in
effect in Ontario, Canada.
f) A novel method for the coordination of SPP-DG investment proposals is
presented in the thesis. This method, the DGCA, proposes using feedback
between the LDC and participating SPPs, and the concept of domains and
commons, to maximize DG investments in the distribution system while
maintaining system operational feasibility.
g) It is demonstrated that the coordination of SPP-DG proposals within the
LDC controlled distribution system is necessary to increase DG penetration
and realize the loss reduction and voltage profile benefits of DG.
6.3 Lessons Learned
Through the process of conducting the research presented in this thesis, many
challenges have been encountered and lessons learned.
6.3.1 Computational Issues
Computational issues played a large role in the development of the models and
methods presented in this thesis. Ideally, a model should be as detailed and accurate
as possible; however, it was quickly realized that many compromises are necessary
in order to make the proposed models computationally feasible.
The dynamic modelling of distribution system planning is an onerous task. In
real-life, physics and economics ideally require the use of integer variables and
non-linear equations for modelling; yet computational and OR resources limit the
size and type of problems solved. In this work, the trade-offs centered on the
modelling of power flows and reactive power elements. Preferably, they would have
been included in the models in this thesis; however, such inclusion would have
necessitated a much more complex model that would have been difficult to solve.
To set appropriate trade-offs, it was necessary to ask ‘what the goals of the
model’ were and, subsequently, what degree of accuracy was needed (i.e. how good
does the solution have to be?). In the work presented in Chapters 3 and 4, the
goals were focused on both economic and technical details. In order to achieve
the goals and maintain feasibility of the work, assumptions were made (such as
unity power factor). Such assumptions will impact the degree of accuracy of the
subsequent solution, and should be checked if they are in keeping with meeting
the goals of the work. In this case, leaving out reactive power was felt to be a
necessary, and permissible, step to meet feasibility requirements of the model. The
goal of providing methods for distribution system planning and policy design, given
a deregulated environment, is still met.
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Finally, the question of ‘what solution is good enough?’ has been raised in
the development of this thesis. With limited computational resources, achieving
a globally optimal solution to a MIP or non-convex NLP is difficult (and hard to
prove). Given the uncertainties present and degree of accuracy in the data, it is
felt that achieving a near-optimal solution is acceptable.
6.3.2 Evolution of the Distribution System
Another challenge encountered during this research was building models adapt-
able to policies governing the development of distribution systems that not only
widely vary between jurisdictions, but also constantly evolve. For example, British
Columbia and Ontario both offer feed-in-tariffs to SPPs to encourage DG invest-
ment, but BC’s tariff is not based on technology [100]. In Ontario, the program
rules are constantly evolving: tariff rates are frequently adjusted and/or eligibility
requirements changed.
This thesis uses data from Ontario’s SOP which was offered in 2008; in 2009,
however, the SOP was replaced by the Feed-in-Tariff program, which offers different
but similar incentives. These constantly changing rules required that an overarching
principle of generality be observed for the research presented in this thesis. As far
as possible, the models were designed to be adaptable to the wide range of policies
and regulations possible.
Regulations and policies are not the only variables in distribution system design
and planning. The distribution system itself is rapidly evolving, especially now,
with the introduction of DG and smart grid technology. On the horizon may be
the wide-spread penetration of plug-in electric vehicles, which may further drive
changes to the planning of distribution systems and its development. The work
presented in this thesis, being general, can accommodate some of these changes.
However, research on such planning methods as presented cannot remain stag-
nant; it is intended that the work presented will form the basis for future research.
For example, issues surrounding the procurement of ancillary services may drive
future planning and design models. The penetration of DG, together with smart
grid penetration, may require future planning models to include the operational as-
pects of the distribution system, necessitated by the intermittency of generation, for
example, or the load shaping opportunities now granted through smart metering.
6.4 Directions for Future Work
Further research can be conducted based on the work presented in this thesis. Some
ideas are presented below:
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a) The long term planning of large, network-configured distribution systems
using mathematical programming techniques remains a formidable task. In-
stead of the heuristic approach that is used in this thesis to verify feeder
sizes in network-configured systems, an implementation into the SPPM’s
framework can be done and is left to future work.
b) In this thesis, parameters, such as market prices, future capital costs, and
SPP investments, etc. are assumed to be deterministic; however, in future
research these may be considered as uncertain. Consequently, stochastic
optimization, or robust programming techniques, can be applied to the two-
stage framework and policy analysis model to mitigate the effects of this
uncertainty.
c) It is assumed in this thesis that SPPs act independently; gaming and collu-
sion amongst SPPs are not considered. However, the vulnerabilities of the
DGCA to instances of gaming needs to be investigated and the DGCA (or
the rules permitting SPP participation) need to be adjusted accordingly.
d) The possibility that SPPs may not follow through with their DG unit pro-
posals is not considered. How this impacts the DGCA, and the resulting
vacancies it may leave in the system, needs to be examined.
e) One method of coordinating DG investments is through financial incentives
or disincentives. The use of such mechanisms to be used in conjunction with
the DGCA can be investigated.
f) It may be useful to examine the role that SPP-DG units have providing









Table A.1: Active and Reactive Loads [86]a

































aThe data has been scaled to suit the requirements of the case studies.
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Table A.2: Feeder Parameters [86]a
Bus-A Bus-B R (1 × 10−4, p.u.) X (1 × 10−4, p.u.)
1 2 3.076 1.567
2 3 2.284 1.163
3 4 2.378 1.211
4 5 5.110 4.411
5 6 1.168 3.861
6 7 4.439 1.467
7 8 6.258 4.617
8 9 6.514 4.617
9 10 1.227 0.406
10 11 2.336 0.810
11 12 9.159 7.206
12 13 3.379 4.448
13 14 3.687 3.282
14 15 4.656 3.400
15 16 8.042 10.74
16 17 4.567 3.581
1 18 1.023 0.976
18 19 9.385 8.457
19 20 2.555 2.985
20 21 4.423 5.848
2 22 2.815 1.924
22 23 5.603 4.424
23 24 5.590 4.374
5 25 1.267 0.645
25 26 1.773 0.903
26 27 6.607 5.826
27 28 5.018 4.371
28 29 3.166 1.613
29 30 6.080 6.008
30 31 1.937 2.258
31 32 2.128 3.308
aThe data has been scaled to suit the requirements of the case studies.
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